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Abstract
Parenting time helps a child to develop non-cognitive skills, whereas material
investment in children along with the state schooling both help developing cognitive
skills. Both cognitive and non-cognitive skills contribute to the formation of human
capital, translating into labour productivity of an adult worker. The numerical
simulations show that following results: (i) parents’ stronger preference to material
investment in children relative than time investment increases the rates of growth, as
well as the higher relative importance of cognitive skills in human capital. However,
the higher importance of parenting time decreases the growth rates. (ii) At the
certain social weight, physical and human capital may under- or over-accumulate
in the same or opposite directions. Laissez-faire economy does coincides with social
optimum. (iii) Labour income taxation and subsidies in material investment are
positive to implement the efficient allocations. Capital income is taxed or subsidized
depending on the relative preference of parenting time and the agent’s patience.
(iv) Policy simulations reveal that higher labour and capital income tax rates both
increases the growth rates. In contrast, public subsidy in material investment has
counter effect to the growth rates. In the benchmark calibration, the best welfare-
maximizing policy reformation is an increase in government spending on education
funded by higher labour income tax rates.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings.
- Marshall (1890)
This thesis composes seven distinct chapters. They are related by their common
theme: the economic analysis on the importance of cognitive and non-cognitive
skill formation in the production of human capital. Furthermore, we explore the
link between the approaches of decentralised economy and centralised economy.
Moreover, we study the taxation implication.
Chapter 2 introduces the competitive equilibrium in a three-periods overlapping
generations model with altruistic agents, where parenting time helps a child to de-
velop non-cognitive skills, whereas material investment in children helps developing
cognitive skills. Both cognitive and non-cognitive skills contribute to the formation
of human capital, translating into labour productivity of an adult worker.
This thesis studies the efficient allocations of the model in Chapter 3. It em-
ploys a long-lived and far-sighted social planner and incorporates the laissez-faire
supported social weight to compare the private discount factor to identify the source
of dynamical inefficiency.
Chapter 4 investigates the dynamical inefficiency by applying the role of gov-
ernment in the overlapping-generations model, in which cognitive skills are formed
by government spending on education and material investment by parents, whereas
parenting time develops children’s non-cognitive skills. Both cognitive skills and
non-cognitive skills build the formulation of human capital.
1
Chapter 5 analyses growth- and welfare-maximising taxation. There are three
focuses in the chapter. The first focus is revenue-neutral government spending. The
second one is growth-maximising rules, which discuss the influences of each policy
variables on the growth rates and presents the sensitivity analysis of the parameters.
The welfare-maximising rules are studied by taxation reforms in the final focus.
This thesis discusses the future researches in Chapter 6, including the usage
of social security, the application of parenting style, the implication of imperfect
market and the feasibility of positive psychology. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes.
2
Chapter 2
Competitive equilibrium
Abstract
This paper examines the importance of parental investment to growth in an OLG
model in which skill formation, a combination of cognitive and non-cognitive skills,
matters for the accumulation of human capital. We show that the sign of the impact
of the relative importance of non-cognitive skills in human capital and the relative
preference for parenting time on growth critically depends on the assumption of the
altruistic motives behind the choice to devote time to children.
Keywords : Skill formation technology, Time allocation, Human capital, Overlapping
generations
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2.1 Introduction
This paper examines the importance of parental investment to growth in an
overlapping generations (henceforth, OLG) model in which skill formation, that is
the combination of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, matters for the accumulation
of human capital and in which parents are altruistic.
The importance of parental investment has been the subject of ongoing historical
debate (Baker et al., 2002; Baumrind, 1978; Bernal and Keane, 2010), in which the
parental investment includes material and time investment (Zhu and Vural, 2013).
There are two examples to argue that material investment is a significant factor
within two different generations (i.e. the current and the next generation). The
first example is material resources, which include financial support, family back-
ground and expectations for children (Schneider and Coleman, 1993). The second
example is nutrition (Victora et al., 2008). However, psychologists argue that time
investment contributes to the development of non-cognitive skills (Baumrind, 1971;
Hirschi and Stark, 1969; Holmbeck et al., 1995; Maccoby and Martin, 1983). The
existing literature shows that time investment is a prime factor influencing children’s
skill formation (Bernal and Keane, 2010; Del Boca and Flinn, 2014).
More recently, Cunha and Heckman (2007) presents a theoretical framework to
organise and interpret a large body of empirical evidence on child development.
Early environments play a large role in shaping later outcomes (e.g Cunha and
Heckman (2008)). In addition, children’s cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes are
largely determined early in life (e.g Cunha et al. (2010)). Heckman and Mosso
(2014) points out that scaffolding is the crucial role of child-parent/child-mentor
relationships (i.e. to track the child closely and encourage them to take feasible
next steps forward in their proximal zone of development). In this paper we build
on Casarico and Sommacal (2018), but we consider the interaction between parental
investment and growth. Prior research has examined skill formation in relation to
human capital (e.g Cunha (2013)), but has not accounted for the role of parental
investment in cognitive and non-cognitive skills as a source of economic growth.
For the purpose of exploring how skill accumulation impacts future human cap-
ital, this paper examines the role of parenting time and material investment in
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children within the overlapping generations model. In the economy, agents live for
three periods: childhood, parenthood and retirement. In the first period, the child
receives material and time investment. In the second period, the agent determines
how much labour income to contributes to child and savings, and how much time to
devote to parenting time and labour supply. In the third period, the agent retires
and consumes all earnings.
The key feature of the model is that it embeds parenting time for the production
of human capital. We assume that the child requires a certain time and that time
contributes to the formation of human capital. We maintain that parents do not
overprovide time to the child, which means parents allocate time between parenting
time and working hours. One more assumption made by this paper is that the child
also requires material investment, which comes from parents’ income. Parental
investment, the combination of parenting time and material investment, influences
the child’s human capital. Also, the delivery of parental investment depends on
the level of parental altruism. More specifically, the agent allocates parenting time
for higher stock of the next generation’s human capital or into labour supply for
higher consumption in retirement. However, the agent enjoys parenting time, so the
agent has to balances parenting time and consumption in retirement. In addition,
we assume the growth rate of the economy depends on human and physical capital.
In particular, we abstract from the role of formal schooling on the accumulation of
human capital because we want to study the repercussions of parental investment
on growth, focusing on skill formation as the main transmission mechanism, an issue
which remains largely unexplored in the theoretical literature.
In the framework we show the rates of growth go down when the importance
of parenting time in human capital formation is higher. This result is close to the
empirical evidence in Fiorini and Keane (2014), which uses data from Longitudinal
Study of Australian Children to point out that parenting time is insignificant in non-
cognitive skills. Intuitively, an increase in productive (rather than unproductive)
time with children is more beneficial human capital accumulation-wise. However, the
reduction in the growth happens because when the wage elasticity of labour supply
is high enough. The time decrease is offset by a larger increase in unproductive time,
5
rather than productive parental time, with negative repression on growth (Casarico
and Sommacal, 2018).
This paper uses numerical simulations to solve the model. We assume that non-
cognitive skills are more malleable than cognitive skills (Cunha et al., 2010) and
parenting time is about 15 percent (Haveman and Wolfe, 1994) to setup the param-
eters. This experiment captures the effect of the relative importance of non-cognitive
skills on growth. We find the growth rate declines under higher importance of non-
cognitive skills. This result depends on the importance of parenting time in human
capital formation. We also find the relative preference of parenting time benefits
growth, but its impact on growth also depends on the importance of parenting time
in human capital formation. This is because the opportunity cost (i.e. decreases in
material investment) increases alongside the increased importance of parenting time
in human capital formation.
The next section presents the main methodology: an OLG model that incor-
porates cognitive and non-cognitive skills into an endogenous growth. Section 3.3
provides numerical solutions to the model and Section 3.4 supplies the numerical
simulations. Finally, this paper concludes.
2.2 The model
The model we introduce draws on the OLG endogenous growth model of Casarico
and Sommacal (2018) but allows for different assumptions of parental investment,
rather than focusing only on time allocation. The canonical OLG endogenous growth
model here undertakes the roles of parenting time and material investment in chil-
dren. The overall size of the population is a scale parameter and normalises to one,
which implies population growth rate is zero. This paper therefore only specifies the
aggregate values.
There are three periods in this life-cycle model: childhood, parenthood and
retirement. In the first period, the child receives material and time investment. In
the second period, the agent determines how much labour income to contribute to
material investment and savings, and how much time to devote to parenting time
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and labour supply. In the third period, the agent retires and consumes all earnings.
The agent has perfect foresight about future variables. The generation that works
during period t is indexed by t. The model is a discrete-time, one-good economy
that begins operation in period 0 and continues over periods t = 1,2,..., extending
indefinitely into the future.
2.2.1 Human capital production function
We consider the production of cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills as inter-
mediate inputs in production of human capital. This paper assumes that parental
investment is endogenous; parents determine how much labour income to contribute
to material investment and savings, and how much time to devote to parenting time
and labour supply. However, in line with Cunha and Heckman (2007), the parents
make no decision about their own human capital accumulation. In particular, we
abstract from the role of formal schooling on the accumulation of human capital,
because we want to study the repercussions of parental investment on growth, fo-
cusing on the skills formation as the main transmission mechanism, an issue which
has so far been afforded little attention by scholars.
The production of cognitive skills
According to the empirical studies, the considered importance of the material
investment in children in the accumulation of human capital is significant (see Bloom
and Canning (2000); Bloom et al. (2002)). The production of cognitive skills uses
material investment in children Zt, which could be intergenerational investment in
private education or children’s consumption. The following equation describes the
technology of cognitive skills production:
Hc,t = f1(Zt) (2.1)
where Hc,t is the level of cognitive skills. Del Boca et al. (2013) suggests time
investment also appears in cognitive skill formation, and Appendix G provides more
details of the appearance of time investment in the accumulation of human capital.
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Assumption 1. f1(·) is a strictly increasing and a strictly concave function
which satisfies the Inada conditions; f1(0) = 0.
The production of non-cognitive skills
The technology of non-cognitive skill formation has been documented in Cunha
et al. (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2008), whose models involve parental invest-
ment to promote a child’s learning process and the accumulation of human capital by
developing non-cognitive skills. Coleman (1988) suggests parents also need a close
relationship with their children to pass their human capital on to their children.
Parental human capital being passed relies on parenting time, so the production of
non-cognitive skills is given by
Hnc,t = f2(φt, Ht) (2.2)
where Hnc,t is the level of non-cognitive skills. Variable φt denotes parenting time.
Ht is parents’ human capital.
Assumption 2. f2(·) is a strictly increasing and a strictly concave function
that satisfies the Inada conditions; f2(0) = 0.
The production of human capital
We assume human capital Ht+1 linearly depends on skill formation and parental
human capital (Cameron and Heckman, 2001):
Ht+1 = f(Hc,t, Hnc,t) (2.3)
According to Assumptions 1 and 2, it is straightforward to verify that the production
of human capital is a strictly increasing and concave function that satisfies the Inada
conditions, and all factors are essential to the production of human capital. In line
with Casarico et al. (2015) this is the simplest way to formalise the idea that parental
investment matters for human capital accumulation.
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2.2.2 Goods production
The economy produces a single, perishable commodity by changing constant-
returns-to-scale technology with physical capital and human capital in each period.
The production function satisfies neoclassical assumptions, including the perfectly
competitive market:
Yt = F (Kt, (Ht, Lt)) (2.4)
where Yt denotes the goods output. F is twice differentiable and positively homo-
geneous of degree one with positive but diminishing marginal products. Kt is the
aggregate level of physical capital at date t. Lt denotes the labour supply.
The following assumption concerning F is made:
Assumption 3. F (·) is a strictly increasing and a strictly concave function
that satisfies the Inada conditions; F (0) = 0.
2.2.3 Household
Parents are the decision-makers in the household. Without loss of generality,
this paper assumes parents do not derive their utility from their own consumption
in adult age but enjoy parenting time and material investment in children. Appendix
B provides the version of the model where parents derive the utility from their own
consumption in adulthood. Therefore, the utility function is given by
Ut = u(Zt, φt, Xt+1) (2.5)
where Xt+1 is the consumption in retirement.
Individual budget constraints
A working agent in adulthood distributes labour income wtHt among material
investment in children Zt and saving St, where wt is the wage rate and Ht is parents’
human capital. In the next period, the agent retires and consumes the return from
savings Xt+1. We assume that the agent do not consume in adulthood to focus on
our main interest which is the impact of parental investment in children on growth.
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Therefore, the budget constraints for the agent in adulthood and in retirement are
Zt + St = LtwtHt (2.6a)
Xt+1 = (1 + rt+1)St (2.6b)
Lt + φt = 1 (2.6c)
where rt is the rental price of physical capital. The budget constraint in adulthood
reflects the trade-off between parenting time and labour supply (De La Croix and
Michel, 2002). There is no ‘accident of birth’ or no role for initial financial wealth,
parenting income, in determining the optimal level of investment because parents
can borrow freely in the market to finance their wealth to maximise the level of
investment (Heckman and Mosso, 2014). According to our interest in this paper,
bequests play no role in this model (Castello´-Climent and Dome´nech, 2008).
2.2.4 First-order conditions
Firm’s optimisation problem
The representative firm takes the wage rate and rental price of physical capital
as given and maximises profits. In the optimum, each input is paid its marginal
product and the profit is zero, hence one observes the following form:
rt =
∂Yt
∂Kt
≡ F (1)t and wt =
∂Yt
∂Ht
≡ F (2)t (2.7)
where rt is rental price of physical capital and wt is the wage rate.
Consumer’s optimisation problem
The agent seeks to maximise the utility subject to lifetime constraints. One can
form a Lagrange function to have first-order conditions for an interior solution with
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respect to Zt, Xt+1, φt and λt:
u
(1)
t = λt (2.8a)
u
(2)
t = λtwtHt (2.8b)
ν ′ =
λt
1 + rt+1
(2.8c)
(1− φt)wtHt − Zt − Xt+1
(1 + rt+1)
= 0 (2.8d)
where λt is the shadow price. Here u
(1)
t ≡ ∂u/∂Zt, u(2)t ≡ ∂u/∂φt and ν ′ ≡ ∂u/∂Xt+1.
Using the first-order conditions, one can formulate the following equation:
u
(1)
t
ν ′
= 1 + rt+1 (2.9)
The left hand side (henceforth, LHS) is the marginal rate of substitution (henceforth,
MRS) between material investment in children and consumption in retirement. The
MRSZt,Xt+1 depends on 1 + rt+1.
Using the first-order conditions, one can observe the following equation:
u
(1)
t
u
(2)
t
= wtHt (2.10)
The LHS is the MRS between material investment and time investment in children.
The MRSZt,φt is determined by labour income.
One can have the following equation by using the first-order conditions:
u
(2)
t
ν ′
= (1 + rt+1)wtHt (2.11)
The LHS is the MRS between parenting and consumption in retirement. The
MRSφt,Xt+1 is 1 + rt+1 multiplying the labour income.
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2.3 Numerical solution
For analytically tractability and further numerical simulations, this paper now
adopts specific functional forms for preferences and technology, frequently used in
macroeconomic literature.
Human capital production function
The production of cognitive skills is
Hc,t = BZt (2.12)
where the variable B is the exogenous productivity.
The production of non-cognitive skills takes the following form:
Hnc,t = Dφt
γHt (2.13)
where D is the efficient factor of the production of human capital with non-cognitive
skills. Parameter γ represents the importance of parenting time.
Therefore, the production of human capital is described as the following equation:
Ht+1 = Hc,t
1−υHnc,tυ (2.14)
where parameter υ denotes the relative importance of cognitive and non-cognitive
skills in the production of human capital. This Cobb-Douglas function describes the
idea that cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills both matter to the production of
human capital. If the relative importance of non-cognitive skills in the production
of human capital is zero, this model reduces to the traditional model which focuses
on the impacts of cognitive skills on human capital formation.
Here we note that human capital does not fully depreciate. If we take log form
of (2.14), we find lnHt+1 = (1 − υ)lnHc + υlnHt + υlnDφtγ. Then we set the
depreciation rate of human capital δH as (1 − υ) to focus on the skill formation as
the main transmission mechanism.
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Goods production
The input-output relation is represented by the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion with constant returns to scale. This production function takes this form:
Yt = AKt
α(LtHt)
1−α (2.15)
where A is an exogenous productivity parameter. Parameter α and 1 − α are the
elasticity of production in terms of physical capital and human capital, respectively.
Household
Following Andreoni (1989) and Taylor and Irwin (2000), the model assumes
warm-glow altruism in the agent’s utility. This paper takes log preference to ensure
the changes in the interest rate have no effect on the savings rate, like the capital-
labour ratio of economy (Acemoglu, 2009). The adult agent’s utility is given by
Ut = (1− η)lnZt + ηlnφt + βlnXt+1, 0 < η < 1 (2.16)
where the parameter β is the time discount factor. In line with the setting in
Becker (1965) and De La Croix and Michel (2002), parameter η represents the
relative preference for parenting time, while (1-η) denotes the relative preference for
parental investment on material resource. Appendix B provides the version of the
model where parents derive the utility from their own consumption in adulthood.
Firm’s optimisation problem
The firm’s profit-maximisation problem is as follows:
max
Kt,Ht
pit = AK
α
t (LtHt)
1−α − wtLtHt − rtKt (2.17)
where pit is the firm’s profit.
Rental rate of physical capital is given by
rt = AαK
α−1
t (LtHt)
1−α (2.18)
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Equation (2.18) states that the interest rate equals the marginal productivity of
physical capital.
Real wage rate of human capital is given by
wt = A(1− α)Kαt (LtHt)−α (2.19)
Equation (2.19) requires that the wage per efficiency unit equals the marginal pro-
ductivity of human capital in efficiency units.
Consumer’s optimisation problem
The agent seeks to maximise the utility (2.16) under lifetime budget constraints
(2.6a) - (2.6c). First-order conditions for an interior solution are
Zt =
1− η
1 + β
wtHt (2.20)
Xt+1 =
β
1 + β
(1 + rt+1)wtHt (2.21)
φt =
η
1 + β
(2.22)
Equation (2.20) gives the equilibrium allocation of material investment in children.
Also, it confirms that parental income affects the material investment in children
directly (Baker et al., 2002; Hout and Dohan, 1996). Equation (2.21) denotes the op-
timal consumption in retirement. Equation (2.22) reflects that the optimum choices
of parenting time which is time-invariant. Equation (2.22) finds that parenting
time depends on the relative preference and patience. The relative preference for
parenting time increases the parenting time, while patience reduces parenting time.
One can use goods production function and (2.19) to rewrite (2.20) as
Zt = zYt (2.23)
where z ≡ [(1 − α)(1 − η)]/(1 − η + β). z is the ratio of material investment in
children to aggregate output.
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2.3.1 Equilibrium
Since there is no international trade and no government part, aggregate invest-
ment equals aggregate savings. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 4. Kt+1 = It = St.
This assumption means the current physical capital stock Kt is fully depreciated
at the end of the current period, which means Kt+1 = It, where It is the aggregate
investment. The equality states physical capital available in next period t+1 equals
the savings from the current period.
The system of equations (2.6a)-(2.8c) describes the competitive equilibrium de-
fined as the following:
Definition 1. (Competitive Equilibrium) For given H0 and K0, a competitive
equilibrium is the path {Zt, Xt, φt, kt, wt, rt}t≥0 that satisfies firm’s optimisation con-
ditions (2.7), agent’s optimisation conditions (2.8a) - (2.8c); the time constraints
(2.6c); the budget constraints (2.6a) and (2.6b) for consumers; and Assumption 4.
All equations (2.6a)-(2.8c) determining competitive equilibrium are also stated
in Appendix C. Given Definition 1, we make the following definition:
Definition 2. (Balanced Growth Path) The balanced growth path is a com-
petitive equilibrium where the allocation {Zt, Xt, φt, kt, wt, rt, St} is time-invariant,
denoted by {Z∗, X∗, φ∗, k∗, w∗, r∗, S∗}, i.e. the transformation variable remains at
the same level.
Definition 2 yields kt+1 = kt = k
∗. Appendix C provides the details of the
variables in a steady state (e.g. Z∗, X∗, w∗, r∗). It verifies that there exists a unique
balanced growth path. Solving Equation k∗ yields
k∗ = ψ
1
1−αυ (2.24)
where ψ ≡ [Aβ(1− α)]/[σ(1 + β)(1− φ)α] and σ ≡ [AB(1− φ)1−αz]1−υDυφγυ. The
LHS of the equation characterises exactly the ratio of physical capital to human
capital in the intensive form, where Kt+1 has to be increased as Ht+1 rises. Thus k
∗
is fixed in equilibrium.
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The rate of growth increases at a constant common rate ρ∗ = Kt+1/Kt − 1 =
Ht+1/Ht − 1. Appendix C shows the details of the derivation.
1 + ρ∗ =
[ Aβ(1− α)
(1 + β)(1− η
1+β
)α
]α(1−υ)
1−αυ
[
Dυ(
η
1 + β
)γυ
[
AB(1− η
1 + β
)1−α
]1−υ] 1−α1−αυ
(2.25)
Equation (2.25) is the balanced growth rates.
Equation (2.25) can be rewritten as
1 + ρ∗ = ξ(η, γ, υ)
where the growth rates contain three psychology factors from utility function and
human capital production. They are the relative preference between material and
parenting time, the importance of parenting time, the relative importance of cogni-
tive and non-cognitive skills in human capital production respectively.
The effects of relative preference for parenting time on growth
To investigate the impact of relative preference for parenting time on growth, we
take the log form of equation (2.25). We then have this equation:
1
(1 + ρ∗)
∂ln(1 + ρ∗)
∂η
=
(1− υ)
(1− αυ)
(2α− 1)
(1 + β − η) +
(1− α)
(1− αυ)
γυ(1 + β)
η
≷ 0 (2.26)
Equation (2.26) finds the impact of the relative preference for parenting time on
growth depends on the importance of parenting time in human capital formation.
This is because the opportunity cost (i.e. decreases in material investment) increases
with the increased importance of parenting time. Equation (2.26) also shows that
the effect of η on ρ∗ also depends on the relative important of non-cognitive skills
in skill formation.
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The effects of the importance of parenting time on growth
The influence of the importance of parenting time in human capital formation
on growth is described as follows:
1
(1 + ρ∗)
∂ln(1 + ρ∗)
∂γ
=
υ(1− α)
1− αυ ln
η
1 + β
< 0 (2.27)
Equation (2.27) finds the rate of growth decreases when the importance of parenting
time in human capital formation is higher. Intuitively, an increase in productive
(rather than unproductive) time with children is more beneficial human capital
accumulation-wise. However, the reduction in growth happens because, when the
wage elasticity of labour supply is high enough, the time decrease is offset by a larger
increase in unproductive time, rather than productive parental time, with negative
repression on growth (Casarico and Sommacal, 2018).
One notes the outcome would be the opposite in a different calibration: the
importance of parenting time and non-cognitive skills have positive effect on growth.
Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) discusses parenting style for different values of the
model parameters, the equilibrium is characterised by different type of altruism,
for instances, strategic altruism. In our model there is only one type of altruism.
However, depending on the model parameters, some economies grow faster when
there is more formal education or higher cognitive skills, and some other economies
grow faster where there is more parenting time or higher non-cognitive skills.
The effects of the relative importance of non-cognitive skills on growth
The impact of the relative importance of non-cognitive skills in human capital
on growth is as follows:
1
(1 + ρ∗)
∂ln(1 + ρ∗)
∂υ
=
1− α
(1− αυ)2
{
lnD + γln
η
1 + β
− (1− α)lnAB
− (1− 2α)ln1 + β − η
1 + β
− αlnAβ(1− α)
1 + β
}
≷ 0
(2.28)
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We find the impact of importance of non-cognitive skills in human capital on growth
depends on the importance of parenting time in the formation of human capital.
Later we provide the numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis of the parameters
to discuss the sign of the LHS in equation (2.28).
2.4 Numerical simulations
Given the rich setting in human capital formation, we cannot provide an analyt-
ical solution and must therefore solve the model numerically. To this end, we have
to assign a value to the parameters of the model. For examples, we use (2.22) to
calculate η, (2.14) to compute B and D and (2.25) to determine A. The bench-
mark parametreisation is selected so as to obtain the balanced growth rate equals
to 2 percent (Basu et al., 2012). Appendix F presents the details of the calibration.
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the values assigned to some parameters and of the
methodology adopted to set the others.
Physical capital share of production α 0.33 Empirical researches
Private discount factor β 0.6095 De La Croix and Doepke (2003)
Calibrated parameters Targeting
Productivity in the goods production A 3.8023 growth rates is 2 percent
Productivity in the cognitive skills
production
B 1.9374 growth rates is 2 percent
Productivity in the non-cognitive
skills production
D 1.9374 growth rates is 2 percent
Discussed parameters
Importance of parenting time γ 0.5
relative preference between material
and time investment
η 0.25 Craig (2005), time investment
is 0.15
Weight of non-cognitive skills υ 0.75 Cunha and Heckman (2007),
human capital production
Table 2.1: Parametrisation
Here the key finding is the reasonable parametrisation. With numerical simula-
tion the relative preference for parenting time is 0.25. This implies parents prefer
to invest more material resources in children than time. We also find the rela-
tive importance of non-cognitive skills is 0.75. The meaning of the number is that
non-cognitive skills have more influence than cognitive skills on the formation of
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the child’s human capital. Moreover, we note the return of parenting time on the
technology of non-cognitive skills is lower than 1 unit. This means 1 unit of time
investment only brings a lower return on the child’s formation of human capital.
As shown in the previous section, the value of the importance of parenting time
in human capital formation, the relative importance of non-cognitive skills in human
capital formation and the relative preference of parenting time in utility are salient
factors with which to determine the relationship between parameters and growth.
Table 2.2 provides the sensitivity analysis of parameters.
Panel A
The relative preference of parenting time (η) 0.248 0.249 0.25 0.251 0.252
Growth rate (ρ∗) 0.0177 0.0189 0.02 0.0212 0.0223
Panel B
The relative importance of non-cognitive skills
in human capital formation (υ)
0.748 0.749 0.75 0.751 0.752
Growth rate (ρ∗) 0.0221 0.0211 0.02 0.019 0.0179
Panel C
The importance of parenting time in human cap-
ital formation (γ)
0.498 0.499 0.5 0.51 0.52
Growth rate (ρ∗) 0.0226 0.0213 0.02 0.0187 0.0175
Table 2.2: Sensitivity analysis
Notes: The top sector (i.e Panel A), in which η = 0.25 is the standard case, investigates how
changes in the relative preference of parenting time affect growth. Panel B, in which υ = 0.75
is the standard case,studies the effect of the relative importance of non-cognitive skills in human
capital formation on the growth. Panel C, in which γ = 0.5 is the standard case, describes the
relationship between the growth and the importance of parenting time in human capital. To
generate the values of the growth rates, we calibrate the exogenous productivity A, B and D. For
details of calibration see Appendix F. We also target the growth rate at 2 %.
With a numerical simulation of a decentralised economy, there are several re-
marks to be made. First, the higher importance of parenting time reduces growth
rates. This result is described in equation (2.27). Second, greater importance of
cognitive skills in human capital production increases growth rates. This result is
close to the empirical evidence in Fiorini and Keane (2014), which uses data from
Longitudinal Study of Australian Children to point out that parenting time is in-
significant in non-cognitive skills. Intuitively, an increase in productive (rather than
unproductive) time with children is more beneficial human capital accumulation-
wise. However, the reduction in the growth happens because when the wage elastic-
ity of labour supply is high enough, the time decrease is offset by a larger increase in
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unproductive time, rather than productive parental time, with negative repression
on growth (Casarico and Sommacal, 2018). Finally, if parents have a stronger pref-
erence for material investment in children relative to time investment then growth
rates are increased.
2.5 Conclusion
In a model in which cognitive and non-cognitive skills affect the human capital
accumulation process, we investigate how parenting time and parental investment
in material resource influence growth.
We show that the rate of growth increases when the importance of parenting time
is lower in the formation of human capital. Equipped with a numerical simulation
of a decentralised economy, we can posit the following: first, greater importance
of cognitive skills in human capital production increases growth rates; and second,
parents having a stronger preference for material investment in children relative
to time investment increases growth rates. The reduction in the growth happens
because, when the wage elasticity of labour supply is high enough, the time decrease
is offset by a larger increase in unproductive time, rather than productive parental
time, with growth being negatively repressed. The numerical simulation results also
suggest the outcome would be the opposite in a different calibration: parenting time
or non-cognitive skills have a positive effect on growth. Doepke and Zilibotti (2017)
notes that the equilibrium is characterised by different types of altruism.
We are aware quantitative assessment of parental investment in skill formation
would require a large scale, fully fledged OLG model with intragenerational het-
erogeneity and a more complete description of the process of human capital accu-
mulation than the one adopted in this paper, which, in particular, abstracts from
schooling in later periods of life.
The law of motion of human capital, H, is included in the agent’s optimization
problem by the assumption of altruism. A parent takes her own human capital as
given, because human capital is formed during childhood, when agents do not make
decisions. So, at time t, parent’s human capital Ht is a state variable. Child’s human
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capital, Ht+1, depends on the parent’s choice of time allocation and labour income
allocation. Specifically, it depends on parenting time and child’s consumption, which
are among the choice variables of the parent.
I model parental altruism as child’s consumption in parent’s utility function.
This is a form of paternalistic, or impure altruism. In solving optimisation problem,
a parent faces a trade-off between child’s consumption and own consumption in
retirement (funded by savings) because of the budget constraint. This constraint
is included in the optimisation problem, and this trade-off is reflected in the first-
order conditions. Therefore, in the model parental investments in child’s human
capital are endogenous (and are accounted for in the first-order conditions), but the
human capital of a working parent is exogenous. The latter can be viewed as an
intergenerational externality.
An alternative assumption on altruistic motive is non-paternalistic, or pure al-
truism, where parent’s utility depends on the child’s utility. In the additive case
parent’s utility can be rewritten in the form equivalent to the utility of an infinitely
lived agent (a dynasty). In this case an intergenerational externality is internalised
because of the additional trade-off between parent’s time in paid work (and parent-
ing time) and child’s future earnings, and between own consumption (funded from
savings), child’s current consumption, and child’s future earnings.
Changing the model so that it includes formation of human capital as a con-
straint, would require changing the assumption on the form of altruism. In other
words, instead of (or in addition to) including parenting time and child’s consump-
tion in parent’s utility function, I would need to include child’s utility in parent’s
utility function. (Or, alternatively, I could include child’s future earnings in parent’s
utility function, which would be another form of paternalistic altruism.) Indeed,
Casarico and Sommacal (2018) compare parental time allocation and implications
for taxation under two different assumptions on altruism in an OLG model, pater-
nalistic and non-paternalistic (referred to as “fully altruistic” in their paper).
This would be an interesting setup to consider and compare with the setup in
this chapter. Such a comparison is beyond the scope of this chapter, and I leave it
for future work.
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We think that investigating theoretically the relationship between parental in-
vestment in skill formation and growth under full altruism is important since, to
the best of our knowledge, we direct empirical research an exist on the importance
of parenting time in human capital formation involved in the child’s human cap-
ital. The result, according to parenting style, may have different implications in
terms of the relationship between parental investment in skill formation and growth
would guide empirical analysis. Further work is needed to understand the relation-
ship in greater depth, and our paper provides the empirical analysis with an useful
theoretical guide.
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Chapter 3
Efficient allocations and dynamical
efficiency
Abstract
We characterise the efficient allocations of parental investment in an OLG model
in which skill formation affects the formation of human capital. The numerical
solutions compare the long-run economic outcomes for various values of the private
discount factor and social weight. The simulation results reveal that physical and
human capital may under- or over-accumulate in the same or opposite directions.
There exists a unique laissez-faire supported social weight, at which a laissez-faire
economy coincides with the social optimum.
Keywords : Skill formation technology, Time allocation, Dynamic efficiency, Over-
lapping generations
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3.1 Introduction
The paper aims at characterising the efficient allocation of parental investment
in an overlapping generations (OLG) model in which skill formation affects the
formation of human capital. By skill formation we mean a combination of cognitive
and non-cognitive skills.
Differences in the accumulation of human capital are large and mostly accounted
for parental investment in cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Bernal and Keane,
2011; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha et al., 2010; Heckman and Mosso, 2014).
Though the existing empirical literature supports the appropriateness of explicitly
including skill formation in human capital process and indicates that the impact
of parental investment on the accumulation of human capital may be altruism-
specific, the theoretical literature focusing on the design of parental investment
in the formation of human capital generally ignore these features. For instance,
previous contributions in the efficient allocation of skill formation literature (see
Casarico et al. (2015)) set up the optimal tax formulas to incorporate type-specific
Pigouvian terms which correct for intergenerational externality in human capital
accumulation. However, one must question whether the accumulation of skills is
efficient. The efficiency issue in the OLG model dates back to Diamond (1965).
The present context is more complicated since the model includes physical and
human capital as the choice variables. A relevant study, Bishnu (2013), introduces
laissez-faire supported social weight. By construction, at the specific social weight,
if there is no externality in the economy, the planner’s allocations coincide with
that of a laissez-faire economy. Within the context of the OLG economy, it has also
been shown that the competitive equilibrium either under-accumulates physical and
human capital or over-accumulates both. Thus, the result eliminates the possibility
of competitive equilibrium deviating from the social optimum in its allocation of
physical and human capital in opposite directions.
By contrast, Docquier et al. (2007) considers a three-overlapping-generations
model of endogenous growth wherein human capital is the engine of growth. Within
the limits of their model, the rationale for the standard pattern of intergenerational
transfers, and the working-aged financing young education and old-age pensions is
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seriously questioned. The problem is more complex when the rate of growth is en-
dogenous. For instance, human capital is the engine of growth. Then, for a given
social rate of time preference, an individual’s saving decisions do not generate the ap-
propriate amount of physical capital accumulation. In the case of over-accumulation,
the intergenerational arrangements can be used to increase the welfare of all (present
and future) generations. The Golden Rule steady state defines the frontier of Pareto
efficient solutions. Introducing a social welfare function is useful in discriminating
within all the efficient solutions.
To explore the efficiency of the allocation in a competitive equilibrium, this paper
employs the social planner to maximise its utility but this is subject to the resource
budget constraints. The planner solves a dynamic-planning problem with declining
social weights over future generations. Moreover, this paper uses the notion of a
laissez-faire supported social weight to compare the allocations in the competitive
equilibrium and the social planner’s allocations.
The numerical comparisons then proceed by contrasting competitive allocations
with those preferred by utilitarian planners with social discount rates. The numer-
ical analysis sheds light on the quantitative relevance of the inclusion of parental
investment in skill formation in terms of the optimal values of choosing variables.
At the chosen parameter values, this paper finds that physical and human capital
can lead to over- or under-accumulation. This finding contrasts with Bishnu (2013)
but is similar to Docquier et al. (2007). In addition, the numerical result suggests
there is a unique laissez-faire supported social weight, i.e., a unique private discount
rate that equals social weight such that a laissez-faire allocation coincides with the
social optimum.
The inclusion of parental investment in the process of skill formation and the
specific impact of parenting time on the formation of the child’s human capital will
be the key aspects of our setup. In our model, parents derive utility from parental
investment and consumption in the retirement. The direct dependency of parental
investment in children represents a warm-glow component.
The way parental altruism is specified is a crucial modelling issue in our model.
There are several possible motivations behind parental investment decisions, in-
25
cluding pure altruism (parents care about the utility of their children) and impure
(warm-glow) altruism (parents derive joy from that parental investment delivered to
their children). To the best of our knowledge, one close study is Casarico et al. (2015)
which nevertheless ignores the efficiency of parental investment in skill formation.
The next section introduces the OLG model. Section 4.3 presents the planning
problem and Section 4.4 provides the numerical solutions. In section 4.5, the results
of simulation include the dynamic efficiency and laissez-faire analysis. Finally, this
paper concludes in section 4.6.
3.2 The model
We consider a three-period OLG model with skill formation, that is combination
of cognitive and non-cognitive skills. In the first period, the child receives material
and time investment. In the second period, the agent determines how much labour
income to contribute to the child and to saving, and how much time to devote to
parenting and labour supply. In the third period, the agent retires and consumes
all earnings.
3.2.1 The consumer
Parents are the decision-makers in the household. Without loss of generality,
this paper assumes parents do not derive their utility from their own consumption
in adult age but enjoy parenting time and materially investing in their children.
Therefore, the utility function is given by
Ut = u(Zt, φt, Xt+1) (3.1)
where Zt is the parental investment in material resource, this can be intergener-
ational investment in private education or the child’s consumption. φt represents
parenting time. Xt+1 is consumption in retirement.
A working agent distributes labour income wtHt among Zt and savings St, where
wt is the wage rate and Ht is the human capital. In the next period, the agent retires
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and consumes the return from savings Xt+1. Moreover, we normalise the parenting
time and labour supply equals 1. Therefore, the budget constraints for the agent in
adulthood and in retirement are
Zt + St = LtwtHt (3.2a)
Xt+1 = (1 + rt+1)St (3.2b)
Lt + φt = 1 (3.2c)
where rt is the rental price of physical capital. Lt denotes the labour supply. Equa-
tions (3.2a) and (3.2b) are the budget constraints for second and third time period.
Equation (3.2c) describes time constraints in adulthood.
3.2.2 Human capital production function
We consider the production of cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills as inter-
mediate inputs in production of human capital.
This paper assumes parental investment is endogenous; parents determine how
much labour income to contribute to material investment and savings, and how
much time to devote to parenting and labour supply. However, in line with Cunha
and Heckman (2007), the parents make no decision on their own human capital
accumulation. In particular, we abstract from the role of formal schooling in the ac-
cumulation of human capital, because we want to study the repercussions of parental
investment on growth, focusing on skill formation as the main transmission mecha-
nism, an issue which remains largely unaddressed in the theoretical literature.
The production of cognitive skills
According to empirical studies, the considered importance of the material in-
vestment in children in the accumulation of human capital is significant (see Bloom
and Canning (2000); Bloom et al. (2002)). The following equation describes the
technology of cognitive skills production:
Hc,t = f1(Zt) (3.3)
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where Hc,t is the level of cognitive skills. We assume that f1(·) is a strictly increasing
and a strictly concave function which satisfies the Inada conditions: f1(0) = 0.
The production of non-cognitive skills
The technology of non-cognitive skill formation involves parental investment to
promote the child’s accumulation of human capital (see, e.g. Cunha and Heckman
(2008); Cunha et al. (2006)). Parents also need a close relationship with their
children in order to pass on their human capital (see, e.g. Coleman (1988)), so the
production of non-cognitive skills is given by
Hnc,t = f2(φt, Ht) (3.4)
where Hnc,t is the level of non-cognitive skills. This paper assumes that f2(·) is a
strictly increasing and a strictly concave function that satisfies the Inada conditions.
We also assume that f2(0) = 0.
The production of human capital
We assume that human capital Ht+1 linearly depends on skill formation and
parental human capital (Cameron and Heckman, 2001):
Ht+1 = f(Hc,t, Hnc,t) (3.5)
It is straightforward to verify that the production of human capital is a strictly
increasing and concave function that satisfies the Inada conditions, and all factors
are essential to the production of human capital. In line with Casarico et al. (2015)
this is the simplest way to formalise the idea that parental investment matters for
human capital accumulation.
3.2.3 Goods production
The economy produces a single, perishable commodity by changing constant-
returns-to-scale technology with physical capital and human capital in each period.
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The production function satisfies neoclassical assumptions, including that of the
perfectly competitive market:
Yt = F (Kt, (Ht, Lt)) (3.6)
where Yt denotes the goods output. F is twice differentiable and positively homo-
geneous of degree one with positive but diminishing marginal products. Kt is the
aggregate level of physical capital at date t. The following assumptions concerning
F are made: F (·) is a strictly increasing and a strictly concave function that satisfies
the Inada conditions: F (0) = 0.
3.3 The planning problem
One important aspect of an OLG models is that the competitive equilibrium need
not be Pareto efficient, in contrast to a competitive model with an infinitely lived
representative agent where the First Welfare Theorem guarantees Pareto efficiency.
The reason behind this property is the so-called double infinity Shell (1971): infinite
horizon and infinite number of agents in the economy. This leads to the infinite
total value of resources, so that Pareto improvement can be achieved by transferring
resources from each young generation to the current old generation. In the context of
the model with altruism and human capital production, the competitive equilibrium
is not generically Pareto optimal even when the intergenerational externality in
human capital production is fully internalised through the non-paternalistic (pure)
altruism. Another attribute of the OLG type models is that it is possible that ’over
saving’ can occur when capital accumulation is added to the model, a situation
which could be improved by a social planner forcing households to draw down their
capital stocks. Therefore, this section will study the efficient allocations.
There exists a long-lived and far-sighted central planner in this economy. It is
therefore possible to improve the welfare of one agent without diminishing the welfare
of another agent, which leads to the First Welfare Theorem (Debreu, 1954). The
central planner chooses the allocations of output to maximise the present discounted
value of current and future generations. In this economy, the social planner looks at
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an exact time period t, and considers whole generations. The social welfare function
takes the following form:
∞∑
t=0
Λ[Ut(Zt, φt, Xt+1)] (3.7)
where Λ is the social planner’s discount factor.
The resource constraints of physical and human capital take the following forms:
Kt+1 = Yt − Zt −Xt (3.8a)
Ht+1 = (BZt)
1−υ(Dφt
γHt)
υ (3.8b)
The objective of the social planner is to maximise the social welfare function
(3.7) subject to physical and human capital resource constraints (3.8a) and (3.8b).
Let us define Lt as the Lagrange formulation, we then form social planner problem
as follows:
Lt =
∞∑
t=0
Λt
{
[Ut(Zt, φt, Xt+1)]
+ Λqt+1[AKt
α(HtLt)
1−α − Zt −Xt −Gt −Kt+1] (3.9)
+ Λµt+1[(BGt
ωZt
1−ω)1−υ(Dφt
γHt)−Ht+1]
}
where qt+1 and µt+1 are the shadow prices of physical and human capital.
First-order conditions for an interior solution (assuming it exists):
∂Lt
∂Zt
= UZt − Λqt+1 + Λµt+1
Ht+1(1− υ)(1− ω)
Zt
= 0 (3.10a)
∂Lt
∂Xt
=
β
Λ
UXt − Λqt+1 = 0 (3.10b)
∂Lt
∂φt
= Uφt − Λqt+1(1− α)
Yt
1− φt + Λµt+1υγ
Ht+1
φt
= 0 (3.10c)
∂Lt
∂Kt
= Λqt+1F
′
Kt − qt = 0 (3.10d)
∂Lt
∂Ht
= Λqt+1(1− α) Yt
Ht
+ Λµt+1υ
Ht+1
Ht
− µt = 0 (3.10e)
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where β is private discounter factor and Λ is the planner’s discount factor (i.e. social
discount factor). When utilities are bounded, the assumption that Λ is smaller
than 1 ensures that objective function is finite. These conditions are necessary and
sufficient for optimally of the constant path starting at k0, as this path satisfies the
transversality condition.
Equation (3.10a) is the optimal allocation of material investment in children.
Equation (3.10b) describes the optimal allocation of old generation. Equation
(3.10c) reveals that the marginal utility of material investment in children corrected
to parenting time is equalised to the marginal utility of the consumption of the old
generation, describing the optimal allocation of the old generation. (3.10c) also in-
dicates that marginal productivity of parenting time on the production of human
capital corrects to the marginal productivity of parenting time on goods produc-
tion function. This result shows that the substitution relationship exists between
the production of human capital and goods production. Therefore, a parent invests
parenting time in children to the level when loss in the labour supply is equal to
the gain in the (altruism-factor) discounted future marginal productivity of par-
enting time arising from children’s human-capital accumulation. Equations (3.10d)
and (3.10e) are the resource constraints of physical capital and human capital of
economy, respectively. Note that, contrary to the standard Diamond (1965) model,
this planner’s first-order condition does not respect the first-order condition the
individual chooses for himself in a decentralised economy.
Using (3.10a) and (3.10b), one can form the following equation:
MRSZt,Xt ≡
UZt
UXt
=
β
Λ
[1 +
µt+1Ht+1(1− υ)
qt+1Zt
] (3.11)
The left-hand side (henceforth, LHS) is the marginal rate of substitution (henceforth,
MRS) between material investment in children and consumption of old generation.
Comparing (3.10a) and (3.10c), one can observe the following equation:
MRSZt,φt ≡
UZt
Uφt
=
1 + (1−υ)µt+1Ht+1
qt+1Zt
F ′Lt +
(1−υ)µt+1Ht+1
qt+1φt
(3.12)
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The LHS is the MRS between material investment and time investment in children.
We arrive at the following equation by using (3.10b) and (3.10c),
MRSφt,Xt ≡
Uφt
UXt
=
β
Λ
[F ′Lt +
µt+1Ht+1υγ
qt+1φt
] (3.13)
The LHS is the MRS between parenting and the consumption of the old generation.
3.4 Numerical solutions
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the quantitative relevance of including
parental investment and skill formation in the human capital production function,
in terms of the optimal values of the chosen variables and in terms of the welfare
loss caused by setting the OLG model, neglecting its effect on the human capital
process and on over-saving. We maintain the three-period structure developed in
the theoretical part of the paper.
Human capital production function
The production of cognitive skills is
Hc,t = BZt (3.14)
where the parameter B is the efficient factor in cognitive skills production.
The production of non-cognitive skills takes the following form:
Hnc,t = Dφt
γHt (3.15)
where D is the exogenous productivity. Parameter γ represents the importance of
parenting time.
We assume that human capital production is conducted by skills formation com-
bining cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Therefore, the production of human capital
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is described in the following equation:
Ht+1 = Hc,t
1−υHnc,tυ (3.16)
where parameter υ is the relative importance of cognitive and non-cognitive skills
in the production of human capital. This Cobb-Douglas function describes the
idea that cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills both matter to the production of
human capital. If the relative importance of non-cognitive skills in the production
of human capital is zero, this model reduces to the traditional model which focuses
on the impact of cognitive skills on human capital formation.
Here, we notice that human capital does not fully depreciate. If we take log form
of (3.16), we find that lnHt+1 = (1 − υ)lnHc + υlnHt + υlnDφtγ. We then set the
depreciation rate of human capital δH is (1 − υ) to focus on skill formation as the
main transmission mechanism.
Goods production
The input-output relation is represented by the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion with constant returns to scale. This production function is as follows:
Yt = AKt
α(LtHt)
1−α (3.17)
where A is an exogenous productivity parameter. Parameter α and 1 − α are the
elasticity of production in terms of physical capital and human capital, respectively.
Household
The model assumes warm-glow altruism in the agent’s utility. This paper takes
log preference to ensure that the changes in the interest rate have no effect on the
savings rate, like the capital-labour ratio of economy (Acemoglu, 2009). The adult
agent’s utility is given by
Ut = (1− η)lnZt + ηlnφt + βlnXt+1, 0 < η < 1 (3.18)
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where the parameter β is the private time discount factor. Parameter η represents
the relative preference for parenting time, while (1-η) is the relative preference for
parental investment in material resource. Appendix B provides the version of the
model where parents derive utility from their own consumption in adulthood.
Firm’s optimisation problem
The representative firm takes the wage rate and rental price of physical capital as
given and maximises its profits pit. In the optimum, each input is paid its marginal
productivity and the profit is zero, hence rental rate of physical capital takes the
following form:
rt = AαK
α−1
t (LtHt)
1−α (3.19)
The real wage rate of human capital is given by
wt = A(1− α)Kαt (LtHt)−α (3.20)
Equation (3.19) states that the interest rate equals the marginal productivity of
physical capital. Equation (3.20) requires that the wage per efficiency unit equals
the marginal productivity of human capital in efficiency units.
Consumer’s optimisation problem
The agent seeks to maximise the utility (3.18) under the life-time budget con-
straints (3.2a) - (3.2c). First-order conditions for an interior solution are
Zt =
1− η
1 + β
wtHt (3.21a)
Xt+1 =
β
1 + β
(1 + rt+1)wtHt (3.21b)
φt =
η
1 + β
(3.21c)
Equation (3.21a) gives the equilibrium allocation of material investment in children.
Also, it confirms that parental income affects the material investment in children
directly (Baker et al., 2002; Hout and Dohan, 1996). Equation (3.21b) is the op-
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timal consumption in retirement. Equation (3.21c) reflects the optimum choices of
parenting time. Equation (3.21c) finds that parenting time depends on the relative
preference and patience.
3.4.1 Balanced growth properties
Competitive economy
We assume that Kt+1 = St. The equality states that physical capital available
in next period t + 1 equals the savings from the current period. This assumption
means the current physical capital stock Kt is fully depreciated at the end of the
current period.
In the balanced growth path, the allocations in a competitive equilibrium {Zt, Xt,
φt, kt, wt, rt, St} are time-invariant, denoted by {Z∗, X∗, φ∗, k∗, w∗, r∗, S∗}, i.e. the
transformation variable remains at the same level. This application yields kt+1 =
kt = k
∗. It is straightforward to verify that there exists a unique balanced growth
path. Solving k∗ yields
k∗ = ψ
1
1−αυ (3.22)
where ψ ≡ [Aβ(1−α)]/[σ(1+β)(1−φ)α]. σ ≡ [AB(1−φt)1−αz]1−υDυφγυ. The LHS
of the equation characterises exactly the ratio of physical capital to human capital
in the intensive form, where Kt+1 has to be increased as Ht+1 rises. Thus k
∗ is fixed
in equilibrium.
The rate of growth increases at a constant common rate ρ∗ = Kt+1/Kt − 1 =
Ht+1/Ht − 1. Appendix C shows the details of the derivation.
1 + ρ∗ =
[ Aβ(1− α)
(1 + β)(1− η
1+β
)α
]α(1−υ)
1−αυ
[
Dυ(
η
1 + β
)γυ
[
AB(1− η
1 + β
)1−α
]1−υ] 1−α1−αυ
(3.23)
Equation (3.23) is the balanced growth rates.
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Centralised economy
We write the social planner problem in Lagrange formulation to yield the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 1. (Sufficient condition for the planner’s optimum) A positive
sequence (Zt, Xt, φt, kt+1)t≥0 satisfying (3.10a)-(3.10e) and the transversality condi-
tion limt→∞ ΛqtKt = 0 and limt→∞ ΛµtHt = 0 is an optimal solution to the planner’s
problem.
Proof. See the following derivation.
Using (3.10d), one obtains
qt+1 =
qt
ΛF ′Kt
=
qtKt
αΛYt
(3.24)
where F ′Kt = αYt/Kt.
Substituting (3.10e) into (3.10c), one yields
µt+1 =
[qtKt(1− α)
α(1− φt) −
η
φt
] φt
ΛυγHt+1
(3.25)
One can plug (3.24) and (3.25) back into Equation (3.10a) to yield
Zt = αYt
[(1− η)
qtKt
− η(1− υ)(1− ω)
qtKtυγ
+
φt
1− φt
(1− α)(1− υ)(1− ω)
αυγ
]
(3.26)
Substituting (3.24) back into Equation (3.10b), one can observe
Xt =
β
Λ
αYt
qtKt
(3.27)
One can plug (3.26) and (3.27) into Kt+1 to obtain
Kt+1 =Yt − αYt
[(1− η)
qtKt
− η(1− υ)(1− ω)
qtKtυγ
+
φt
1− φt
(1− α)(1− υ)(1− ω)
αυγ
− β
Λ
1
qtKt
]
(3.28)
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Multiplying (3.24) and (3.28) term by term, one has
qt+1Kt+1 = qtKt
[(1− φt)υγ − φt(1− α)(1− υ)
αΛυγ(1− φt)
]
+
Λη(1− υ)− Λυγ(1− η)− βυγ
Λ2υγ
(3.29)
Since F ′Kt = αYt/Kt, qtKt is the solution to linear dynamic Equation (3.29), and
the general solution to this equation is
qtKt =
α(1− φt)[Λη(1− υ)− Λυγ(1− η)− βυγ]
Λ(αΛ− 1)(1− φt)υγ + Λφt(1− α)(1− υ) + ε
[(1− φt)υγ − φt(1− α)(1− υ)
αΛυγ(1− φt)
]t
(3.30)
with ε as a real constant.
According to De La Croix and Michel (2002), there is a unique solution which
satisfies the transversality condition limt→∞ ΛqtKt = 0 and limt→∞ ΛµtHt = 0: the
constant solution. The transversality condition states that the limit of the actual
shadow value of the capital stock equals zero. Therefore, this subsection has the
following equation:
qtKt =
α(1− φt)[Λη(1− υ)− Λυγ(1− η)− βυγ]
Λ(αΛ− 1)(1− φt)υγ + Λφt(1− α)(1− υ) (3.31)
Since qtKt = constant satisfies the transversality condition, the solution for
Equation (3.10e) should be µtHt = constant, hence this subsection yields
µtHt = µt+1Ht+1 = qtKt
(1− α)
α(1− Λυ) (3.32)
We can rewrite (3.10c) to make the allocation of parenting time in equilibrium:
η
φt
= qtKt
[1− α
α
1
1− φt −
Λυγ
α(1− Λυ)
1
φt
]
(3.33)
Finally, using qt+1Yt = qtKt/αΛ and (3.10a)-(3.10e), one finds that the parenting
time is a time-invariant variable as
φ =
ηΛ(αΛ− 1)(1− Λυ) + Λ(1− α)[Λη(1− υ)− Λυγ(1− η)− βυγ]
(1− α)[−Λ(1− η)− β][(1− Λυ) + Λγυ] + ηΛ(αΛ− 1)(1− Λυ) + ηΛ2(1− α)(1− υ)
(3.34)
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Equation (3.34) is the social planner’s allocation of parenting time. We find that
parenting time (i.e. φt) is additionally determined by the relative importance be-
tween cognitive and non-cognitive skills in human capital production (i.e. υ) and
the importance of parenting time in the formulation of non-cognitive skills (i.e. γ),
rather than just private discount factor (i.e. β) and the altruism level (i.e. η) as
reported in (3.21c).
One can use (3.17), (3.31), (3.34) to observe material investment in (3.26) as
Z = ZF (Kt, (Ht, Lt)) (3.35)
where Z ≡ [Λγυ(αΛ− 1) + Λ(1−α)(1−υ) φ
1−φ
] 1−η− η(1−υ)
υγ
Λη(1−υ)−Λυγ(1−η)−βυγ +
φ
1−φ
(1−α)(1−υ)
υγ
.
Here it is required that the material investment in children is strictly positive.
One can use first order conditions and (3.34) to observe
X = XF (Kt, (Ht, Lt)) (3.36)
where X ≡ Λγυ(αΛ−1)+Λ(1−α)(1−υ)
φ
1−φ
Λη(1−υ)−Λυγ(1−η)−βυγ . Equation (3.36) is greater than zero. Con-
sumption in retirement is strictly positive.
One can have the physical capital in t+1 in the following equation by plugging
(3.10a)-(3.10e) and (3.34) into the resource constraints of physical capital:
Kt+1 = F (Kt, (Ht, Lt))αΛ (3.37)
Plugging (3.10a)-(3.10e) and (3.34) into Ht+1, we obtain
Ht+1 = F (Kt, (Ht, Lt))
1−υϑHυt (3.38)
where ϑ is constant parameter collection, ϑ ≡ 〈BZ〉1−υ〈Dφγ〉υ.
Finally, one can use (3.37) and (3.38) to obtain the physical-human capital ratio
in the following form:
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Ht+1
= ∆(
Kt
Ht
)αυ (3.39)
where ∆ ≡ αΛAυ(1− φ)(1−α)υ/ϑ. 
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Let us define ∆ = Kt+1/Ht+1, so the efficient ratio of physical capital to human
capital is
k∗ = ∆
1
1−αυ (3.40)
The dynamic system (3.35)-(3.39) cannot in general solved explicitly, as the
planner’s chosen allocation is described by a set of non-linear difference equations
(see, e.g. De La Croix and Michel (2002)). In the general case, further insights into
the properties of the solutions can be drawn by first considering the steady state.
This analysis is conducted in the next subsection. We also list all the solutions of
social planner’s problem in Appendix D.
Growth rates
Substituting (3.31) into (3.28), the growth rates in a centralised economy take
the following form:
1 + %∗ = αΛA(
Kt
Ht
)α−1(1− φ)1−α (3.41)
Equation (3.41) is the balanced growth rates, which depends on the productivity
parameters in the goods and human capital production, the relative importance of
material investment in human capital production, the relative preference for parent-
ing time in individual’s utility function and the social discount factor, Λ.
3.4.2 Laissez-faire economy
At the specific social weight, if there is no externality in the economy, the plan-
ner’s allocations coincide with that of a laissez-faire economy (Bishnu, 2013). Within
the context of the OLG economy, it has also been shown that the competitive equi-
librium either under- or over-accumulates physical and human capital. Thus, the
result eliminates the possibility of competitive equilibrium deviating from the social
optimum in its allocation of physical and human capital in opposite directions.
By contrast, Docquier et al. (2007) considers a three-overlapping-generations
model of endogenous growth wherein human capital is the engine of growth. Within
the limits of their model, the rationale for the standard pattern of intergenerational
transfers, and the working-aged financing youth education and old age pensions
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comes into question. The problem is more complex when the rate of growth is en-
dogenous. For instance, human capital is the engine of growth. Then, for a given
social rate of time preference, an individual’s saving decisions do not generate the ap-
propriate amount of physical capital accumulation. In the case of over-accumulation,
the intergenerational arrangements can be used to increase the welfare of all (present
and future) generations. The Golden Rule steady state defines the frontier of Pareto
efficient solutions. Introducing a social welfare function is useful in discriminating
among all the efficient solutions. Therefore, this subsection uses the notion of a
laissez-faire supported social weight to explore the efficiency of the optimal alloca-
tion in a competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 1. If there exists a laissez-faire supported social weight β¯, it must be
unique.
To prove this Lemma, this section defines kt
SP = Kt
SP/Ht
SP as the efficient
capital per capita and rewrites k∗SP in (3.40) as a function of Λ. As Λ ∈ (0, 1),
then limΛ→0 k∗SP (Λ) = 0, limΛ→ 1 k
∗
SP (Λ) ≡ k∗SPmax and thus, k∗SP ∈ (0, k∗SPmax).
Let us suppose that there exists a laissez-faire supported social weight β¯. Since
k∗SP strictly increases in Λ, it follows that there exists a unique level of k
∗
SP that
corresponds to β¯. If one denotes by k∗SP (β¯) the level of k
∗
SP corresponding to β¯,
then k∗SP (β¯) ∈ (0, k∗SPmax).
This last part indicates that, given a social optimum, and thus the level k∗SP ,
there is a unique β¯. Given the uniqueness of the result of k∗SP , this paper also
establishes the following uniqueness result:
Lemma 2. If there exists a β¯ = Λ such that KSP (β¯) = KCE holds, then
HSP (β¯) = HCE.
To prove this Lemma, this section defines kt
CE = Kt
CE/Ht
CE as the efficient
capital per capita and rewrite k∗CE in(3.22). The uniqueness result in Lemma 2
follows directly from human capital production, because there is no spillover from
human capital and the form for CE is the same as for SP.
To find such laissez-faire supported social weight, the next section simulates the
model and provides numerical simulations of the comparison between the discount
factor and social weight over generations.
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3.5 Numerical simulations
In the presence of dynamic efficiency and thus, it does not guarantee that kCE
∗
and kSP
∗ are identical. To make meaningful comparisons, this paper follows Bishnu
(2013) and establishes a common point by devising the notion of a ’laissez-faire sup-
ported’ social weight, denoted by Λ. By construction, at this specific social weight,
if there is no externality, the planner’s allocation coincides with the laissez-faire
allocation. However, in the presence of consumption externalities, at this specific
social weight, the laissez-faire allocation may differ from the planner’s allocation.
Variables
Material investment Zt
Time investment φt
Consumption in retirement Xt+1
Labour supply Lt
Wage rate wt
Saving St
Human capital Ht
Cognitive skills Hc,t
Non-cognitive skills Hnc,t
Output Yt
Physical capital Kt
Profit of firms pit
Parameters
Capital share of production α
Private discount factor β
Importance of parenting time γ
Subsidies on material investment in children θ
Relative preference between material and time investment η
Weight of non-cognitive skills υ
Exogenous productivity in the goods production A
Exogenous productivity in the production of cognitive skills B
Exogenous productivity in the production of non-cognitive skills D
Social discount factor Λ
Laissez-faire supported discount factor β¯
Table 3.1: Variables and parameters
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Assigned parameters
Capital share of production α 0.33 Empirical researches
Private discount factor β 0.6095 De La Croix and Doepke (2003)
Calibrated parameters Targeting
Importance of parenting time γ 0.5
relative preference between material
and time investment
η 0.25 Craig (2005), time investment
is 0.15
Weight of non-cognitive skills υ 0.75 Cunha and Heckman (2007),
human capital production
Exogenous productivity in the goods production A 3.8023 growth rates is 2 percent
Exogenous productivity in the production
of human capital with cognitive skills
B 1.9374 growth rates is 2 percent
Exogenous productivity in the production
of human capital with non-cognitive skills
D 1.9374 growth rates is 2 percent
Discussed parameters
Social discount factor Λ 0.6095 Docquier et al. (2007) and
Bishnu (2013)
Table 3.2: Parametrisation
Notes: The assigned parameters are based on empirical research. The parameters in the second
section are calibrated to empirical research, while the exogenous productivity are targeted with
the growth rate as 2%. To generate the value of the social discount factor, we follow the previous
research to set up the number. For details of calibration see Appendix F.
3.5.1 The benchmark values
Given the rich setting in human capital formation, we cannot provide an an-
alytical solution and therefore, we solve the model numerically. To this end, we
have to assign a value to the parameters of the model: Table 3.1 summarises all the
variables and parameters, and Appendix F presents the details of the calibration.
Moreover, in line with Docquier et al. (2007) and Bishnu (2013), the parameter
reasonably range from 0.67 (0.5% annual rate of time preference) to 0.9 (2% an-
nual rate). This paper chooses the value of social discount factor to be 0.6095 (i.e.
Λ = 1/(1.02)25). Attributing all of the growth in multifactor productivity to growth
in labour-augmenting productivity, A, implies that the growth rates of A is 3.8023
to set growth rates at 2 percent per year. Using a backwards solving method (i.e.
swapping endogenous variables and parameters) and assuming B = D, we obtain
B = D = 1.9374. Since this calibration is not exact, the growth rates are not com-
parable across papers. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the values assigned to some
parameters and of the methodology adopted to set the others.
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3.5.2 Comparison of competitive equilibrium and social op-
timum for different values of private discount factor
and social weight over generations
This section studies how the equilibrium compares with the social optimum ac-
cording to β and Λ. Applying the benchmark values and checking robustness, this
paper summarises the results in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 to form the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The levels of physical and human capital in a competitive
equilibrium may differ from those in the social optimum. Human and physical capital
may accumulate in the opposite directions.
Figure 3.1: The comparison of physical capital in the compet-
itive equilibrium and efficient allocations
Notes: The x-axis represents the values of private discount rate (β) in
a competitive economy. The degree of social weight (Λ) in a centralised
economy is presented by the y-axis. The values of the z-axis represent
the difference between the physical capital in the competitive equilibrium
(KCE) and efficient allocations (KSP ). If the value in the z-axis is positive,
this implies there is over-accumulation of physical capital (KCE > KSP ).
Proof. There is under- (or over-accumulation) in the competitive allocations of
physical and human capital. For instances, physical and human capital are both
under-accumulated when β is low (e.g. β = 0.3) and Λ is high (e.g. Λ = 0.9). In
contrast, there is over-accumulation of physical and human capital by the compet-
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Figure 3.2: The comparison of human capital in the competitive
equilibrium and efficient allocations
Notes: The x-axis represents the values of private discount rate (β) in
a competitive economy. The degree of social weight (Λ) in centralised
economy is presented by the y-axis. The values of the z-axis represent
the difference between the human capital in the competitive equilibrium
(HCE) and efficient allocations (HSP ). If the value in the z-axis is positive,
this implies there is over-accumulation of human capital (HCE > HSP ).
itive economy when β is high and Λ is low: When the β = 0.9 and Λ = 0.3, the
values of the z-axis in figure 3.1 and 3.2 are positive.
Moreover, we can observe that physical and human capital accumulates in differ-
ent directions at pairs of low (high) β and Λ. In the first example, human capital is
under-accumulated and physical capital is over-accumulated by one economy with
low β and low Λ. The other example is that one economy with high β and high Λ
under-accumulates human capital and over-accumulates physical capital. 
The critical thresholds for β and Λ are clearly additionally dependent on the other
parameters. For example, on the one hand, as the private rate of time preference
decreases, individuals tend to save more. This pushes the interest rate downwards
and stimulates investment in human capital. Since both physical and human capital
accumulation increase with β as the first-best, both physical and human capital
over-accumulate. On the other hand, individuals tend to save less as β is low and
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Figure 3.3: The ratio of physical capital to human capital in
baseline
Notes: The x-axis represents the values of private discount rate (β) in
a competitive economy. The degree of social weight (Λ) in centralised
economy is presented by the y-axis. The values of the z-axis represent the
difference between the efficient capital ratio in the competitive equilibrium
(kCE) and efficient allocations (kSP ). If the value in the z-axis is positive,
this implies there is over-accumulation of physical capital (kCE > kSP ).
Λ is high. This means both human and physical capital are under-accumulated. In
addition, given Proposition 2, we make the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. If β = Λ, there are over-accumulation of physical capital and
under-accumulation of human capital.
Proof. On the one hand, when the competitive economy is under low private
discount factor (e.g. β = 0.3) and the social weight is low (e.g. Λ = 0.3), human
capital is under-accumulated and physical capital is over-accumulated. On the other
hand, when the private and social weight are both high (β = Λ = 0.9), human capital
is under-accumulated and physical capital is over-accumulated. 
This proposition states a scenario in which the private discount factor β equals
the social discount factor Λ and accumulates too much physical capital, while it
generates too little human capital.
Moreover, Proposition 2 and 3 implies that both physical and human capital can
over- or under- accumulates, one can define kCE = Kt
CE
HtCE
and kSP = Kt
SP
HtSP
to find
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that a scenario in which Laissez-faire economy coincides the social optimum. This
paper finds the following proposition:
Proposition 4. There exists a β¯ = Λ such that kSP (Λ) = kCE.
Proof. On the one hand, when β is low and Λ is high, there is under-accumulation
of physical and human capital. On the other hand, there is over-accumulation of
physical and human capital with high β and low Λ. 
Proposition 4 specifies the weight at which the allocations in CE and SP are
identical in this economy. This result ensures Lemma 2 holds. This result implies
that there is no over- or under-accumulation of both types of capital. The implication
is supported by Bishnu (2013). The efficient allocation coincides with that of a
laissez-faire economy.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has characterised the optimal level of parental investment in skill
formation in an overlapping generations model in which cognitive and non-cognitive
skills affect the production of human capital. As far as we know, this is the first
model to include parental investment in human capital production function to anal-
yse the efficient allocation.
We postulate that the objective of the social planner is to maximise its utility
with material investment in children, the consumption in old age and parental time,
which is subject to resource budget constraints. Additionally, this paper considers
laissez-faire supported social welfare to compare the competitive equilibrium and
efficient allocations.
The findings of numerical simulations are that, at the chosen social weight,
the levels of physical and human capital in a competitive equilibrium are differ-
ent from those in the social optimum. Physical and human capital can under- or
over-accumulated in the same or opposite directions depending on the pairs of pri-
vate and social discount factors. For example, when private discount factor is low
and social discount factor is high, there are under-accumulation of physical and
human capital. On the other hand, there are over-accumulation of physical and
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human capital when the economy is with high private discount factor and low social
discount factor. In addition, If private discount factor equals social discount factor,
there are over-accumulation of physical capital and under-accumulation of human
capital. Therefore, a laissez-faire economy coincides with the social optimum.
Since dynamic efficiency occurs at certain social weights, a central questions
arises: how does optimal taxation adjust the dynamic efficiency? The analysis
presented in this paper, despite its simplifying assumptions, shows that the existence
of a link between parental time devoted to children and child’s human capital can be
relevant for the design of public policies. It also provides the grounds and motivation
for further empirical analysis to improve our knowledge of how alternative parental
investment in skill formation can shape the human capital accumulation process.
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Chapter 4
Optimal taxation
Abstract
We examine the effects of income taxation and the subsidy on growth in an over-
lapping generations (OLG) model, in which government spending on education and
skill formation enter the human capital production function as complements. With
respect to previous contributions, optimal tax formulas correct the intergenerational
externality in human capital accumulation. The simulation results find that labour
income taxation and subsidies in material investment are positive to implement the
efficient allocations. Government should reduce capital and labour income tax rates
to subsidise parental investment in material resources.
Keywords : Skill formation technology, Time allocation, Human capital, Overlapping
generations, Optimal taxation
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4.1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine the effects of income taxation and the subsidy on
growth in an overlapping generations (OLG) model, in which government spending
on education and the skill formation enter the human capital production function
as complements. The skill formation depends on parental investment. By parental
investment, we mean both parenting time and material investment (e.g. private
spending on education). Parental investment plays a role in the process of skill
formation because it affects the quality of the early childhood environment, which
in turn affects the growth rate of the economy.
There is a large body of literature in which taxation and growth have been exam-
ined (see Gemmell et al. (2011); Myles (2000); Nijkamp and Poot (2004)). Models
have also been developed in which growth is driven by human capital accumulation
that is related to one or more of the following three inputs: public schooling, the
parents’ or children’s private expenditure on schooling and children’s time invest-
ments (e.g. Lee and Gordon (2005); Myles (2009)). Nonetheless, according to the
psychology and sociology literature, parental investment in skill formation is crucial
for children’s human capital acquisition. For instance: 1) Subsidising parental in-
vestments is more cost-effective in improving the later life outcomes of children such
as schooling attainment or earnings (Cunha and Heckman, 2007); 2) Targeted public
investments and targeted transfers restricted to child-related goods that guarantee
minimum investment amounts to every child to increase the level of investments
received by the children of the least-active parents (Caucutt and Lochner, 2012);
3) Del Boca and Flinn (2014) shows that unrestricted transfers increase the time
parents spend with their children through a wealth effect. Therefore, one must con-
sider how a benevolent government should tax capital in a neoclassical production
economy when parents make a material investment in cognitive skills and a time
investment in non-cognitive skills. A close study is conducted by Casarico et al.
(2015), which suggests that omissions of parenting time from the technology of skill
formation can bias the results related to the impact of labour income taxation on
growth. Such inconsistency motivates a general question relating to the justification
of such a taxation policy. Thus, our aim is to explore the role of optimal taxation in
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restoring dynamical inefficiency and we focus purely on distortionary taxation. Prior
research has examined public subsidies to day care (e.g. Blomquist et al. (2010);
Casarico and Sommacal (2012)), but it has not accounted for the role of parental
investment in skill formation on human capital accumulation.
This paper investigates how the tax policy can be used to restore the efficiency.
The model examines the role of parenting time, material investment in children
and tax policies in a three-period OLG endogenous growth model. Agents live for
three periods: childhood, parenthood and retirement. In the first period, the child
receives subsidised material investment from the government and time investment.
Material investment contains the government spending on education and private
material resources, whereas time investment involves parenting time. In the second
period, the agent determines how much after-tax labour income to contribute to
child and how much to save, as well as how much time to devote to parenting and
labour supply. This paper also assumes that parents derive utility from parenting.
In the third period, the agent retires and consumes all the after-tax income.
The distinctive feature of our model is that schooling and the quality of the
early childhood environment enter the production function of human capital as
complements. Because the quality of the early childhood environment depends on
parental investment, labour and capital income taxation influence the growth rate
not only through the decision to invest in schooling – as is standard – but also
through time investment (i.e. through the effect on parenting time).
Our completely analytical characterisation of the solution to the Ramsey prob-
lem allows us to show explicitly that optimal taxation depends on the values of
parameters. At the chosen parameter values, the optimal labour income tax rates
and subsidies in material investment implementing efficient allocations are positive.
In addition, the government should reduce capital and labour income tax rates to
subsidise more material investment to justify the dynamical efficiency in a com-
petitive equilibrium. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis of income taxation and the
subsidies shows the following three scenarios to restore the dynamical efficiency: 1)
the agent is more impatient; 2) the labour income tax rate is relatively low; 3) the
subsidies to parental investment on material resource is relatively high.
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The inclusion of parental investment in the skill formation process on human
capital accumulation will be the key aspects of our setup. In our model, parents
derive utility from their parenting time, from material investment in child and from
the consumption in retirement. The direct dependency of the parents’ utility on
parental investment represents a warm-glow component. The government is em-
powered with two nonlinear taxes on labour and capital income. In addition, it can
enforce a level of parenting time which is optimally selected. We theoretically char-
acterise the social welfare-maximising policy and also perform a numerical analysis
to shed light on the quantitative relevance of the inclusion of parental investment
in the human capital production function, both in terms of the optimal values of
the policy variables and in terms of the welfare losses caused by setting a policy
neglecting its effect on parental investment and on the skill formation process.
The way parental altruism is specified is a crucial modelling issue here. There
are several possible motivations behind child care decisions, including pure altruism
(parents care about the utility of their children) and impure (warm-glow) altruism
(parents derive joy from the level of human capital that child care arrangements
deliver to their children). To the best of our knowledge, no direct empirical test exists
on the type of altruism involved in the parental decision to devote time to children.
However, the evidence on intrafamily income transfers, though not conclusive, rejects
the predictions of pure altruism but tends to be consistent with warm-glow altruism
(see Casarico et al. (2015); Casarico and Sommacal (2012)). Accordingly, we rely on
the warm-glow assumption, which is shared by many papers, on intergenerational
transmission of human capital and wealth (e.g. Glomm and Kaganovich (2008)),
and it can also be found in optimal taxation literature (see Cremer and Pestieau
(2006); Kopczuk (2013)).
In section 2, this paper introduces the main methodology: an overlapping gener-
ations model that incorporates non-cognitive skills, parenting time and altruism into
an endogenous growth model. Section 3 represents the social optimum and Section
4 studies optimal taxation to restore the efficiency. Section 5 reports the results of
the simulation on optimal taxation, after which the paper is concluded in Section 6.
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4.2 The model
We develop an OLG model with intragenerational homogeneity and endogenous
growth driven by human capital accumulation. Agents have perfect foresight about
future variables. They live for three periods: childhood, parenthood and retirement.
The population is constant, and the size of each generation is equal to N. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume a small open economy.
In the first period, the agent receives parenting time and material investment in
schooling, borrowing from the capital market. In the second period, the agent has
one child and decides how much to consume and save, and how much time to devote
to labour and the child. The child requires a given care time. In the third period,
the agent retires and consumes all income.
This paper assumes that parental investment is endogenous; parents determine
how much labour income to contribute to material investment and savings, and
how much time to devote to parenting time and labour supply. However, in line
with Cunha and Heckman (2007), the parents make no decision related to their
own human capital accumulation. In particular, we abstract from the role of formal
schooling in the accumulation of human capital, because we want to study the
repercussions of parental investment for growth, focusing on skill formation as the
main transmission mechanism.
4.2.1 Human capital production function
This paper considers the importance of government spending on education Gt
and parental investment in the material resource Zt (e.g. private spending on edu-
cation) in the production of cognitive skills.
Hc,t = BGt
ωZt
1−ω (4.1)
where B is the exogenous productivity. Parameter ω determines the relative impor-
tance of government spending on education and material investments in the cognitive
skills production. This Cobb-Douglas production function captures the interaction
between government spending on education and material investments in children.
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The production of non-cognitive skills takes the following form:
Hnc,t = Dφt
γHt (4.2)
where D is the exogenous productivity. Parameter γ represents the importance of
parenting time. φt is the parenting time. Ht is the parents’ human capital.
The production of human capital is described as follows:
Ht+1 = Hc,t
1−υHnc,tυ (4.3)
where parameter υ is the relative importance of cognitive and non-cognitive skills
in the production of human capital. Here we note that human capital does not fully
depreciate. If we take log form of (4.3), we find that lnHt+1 = (1−υ)lnHc+υlnHt+
υlnDφt
γ. Then we set the depreciation rate of human capital δH is (1− υ) to focus
on the skill formation as the main transmission mechanism.
4.2.2 Goods production
This production function in the goods sector takes this form:
Yt = AKt
α(LtHt)
1−α (4.4)
where Yt and Kt represent the total output and physical capital, respectively. A is
the total factor productivity. Parameter α and 1−α are the elasticity of production
with respect to physical capital and human capital, respectively. Lt determines time
spent on supplying labour to the market.
4.2.3 Household
The model assumes warm-glow altruism in the agent’s utility. This paper takes
log arithmetic preference to ensure that income and substitute effect exactly cancel
each other out, so that changes in the interest rate have no effect on the saving rate:
Ut = (1− η)lnZt + βlnXt+1 + ηlnφt, 0 < η < 1 (4.5)
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where the parameter β is the psychology discount factor (i.e. patience). Xt+1 is
the consumption in retirement. Parameter η represents the relative preference of
parenting time.
A working agent distributes labour income wtHt among material investment Zt
and Saving St. Moreover, when the agent receives the return from savings and
allocates it on consumption Xt+1. Therefore, the budget constraints for the agent
at adulthood and retirement are
(1− θ)Zt + St = (1− τL)(1− φt)wtHt (4.6a)
Xt+1 = [1 + (1− τk)rt+1]St (4.6b)
Lt + φt = 1 (4.6c)
where variable θ represents the subsidies to the material investment in children.
Variables τL and τK are labour and capital income tax rates.
4.2.4 Government
The government has at its disposal the following policy instruments: government
spending on education, subsidise to parents’ material investment in children, taxes
on labour income and capital income taxation. In line with Caucutt and Lochner
(2012), we assume that the government runs a balanced budget and funds subsidies
and education spending from the tax revenues:
θZt +Gt = τLwtHtLt + τKrtKt (4.7)
This subsection takes parameters τL, τK and θ as the exogenous policy variables.
4.2.5 First-order conditions
The firm’s optimisation problem
The firm determines the demand of physical capital and human capital by max-
imising its profit pit with given factor prices of wage and rent, which are determined
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under a competitive market. Therefore, the firm’s optimisation problem takes the
following form:
max
Kt,Ht
pit = AK
α
t (LtHt)
1−α − wtHtLt − rtKt (4.8)
This problem shows the firm sells its goods and pays the rental rate of physical
capital and the real wage rate of human capital.
Rental rate of physical capital is given by
rt = AαK
α−1
t (LtHt)
1−α (4.9)
Eq. (4.9) states that the interest rate equals the marginal productivity of capital.
The real wage rate per unit of human capital is given by
wt = A(1− α)Kαt (LtHt)−α (4.10)
Eq. (4.10) requires that the wage per efficiency unit equals the marginal productivity
of aggregate labour in efficiency units.
The agent’s optimisation problem
One can form a Lagrange function as follows:
Lt =(1− η)lnZt + βlnXt+1 + ηlnφt
+ λt
{
(1− τL)(1− φt)wtHt − (1− θ)Zt − Xt+1
[1 + (1− τK)rt+1]
}
(4.11)
where λt is the shadow price of physical capital.
First-order conditions for an interior solution with respect to Zt, Xt+1, φt takes
the following forms:
Zt =
(1− η)(1− τL)
(1 + β)(1− θ) Htwt (4.12a)
Xt+1 =
β[1 + (1− τK)rt+1](1− τL)
1 + β
Htwt (4.12b)
φt =
η
1 + β
(4.12c)
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Eq. (4.12a) gives the equilibrium allocation of material investment in children.
Eq. (4.12b) is the optimal consumption in old age. Eq. (4.12c) reflects the op-
timum choices for parenting time. (4.12c) finds that parenting time only depends
on patience and the strength of altruism; the relative preference for parenting time
increases parenting time.
One can use (4.9) and (4.10) to rewrite (4.12a) as
Zt = zYt (4.13)
where z ≡ [(1− α)(1− η)(1− τL)]/[(1− η + β)(1− θ)]. z represents the proportion
of material investment.
Plugging the rental rate of physical capital, the real wage rate of human capital,
the equilibrium and (4.13), one can observe
Gt = gYt (4.14)
where g ≡ ατK + (1− α)[τL − θ(1− η)(1− τL)/(1− η + β)(1− θ)], g is the ratio of
government spending on education to aggregate output.
Definition 3. For given H0 and K0, a competitive equilibrium is the path
{Zt, Xt, φt, kt, wt, rt, St}t≥0 that satisfies the government balanced constraints (4.7),
production of human capital (4.1) - (4.2), the firm’s optimisation conditions (4.9)
and (4.10) and the agent’s optimisation conditions (4.12a) - (4.12c)
4.2.6 Balanced growth path
We assume the current physical capital stock Kt is fully depreciated at the end of
the current period. In a balanced growth path, the transformation variable remains
at same level. This yields kt+1 = kt = k
∗. It is straightforward to verify that there
exists a unique steady state. Solving for k∗ yields
k∗ = ψ
1
1−αυ (4.15)
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where ψ is the collection of parameters, and ψ ≡ Aβ(1−α)(1−τL)/σ(1+β)(1−φ)α.
σ ≡ [AB(1 − φ)1−αgωc1−ω]1−υDυφγυ. The left-hand side of the equation is exactly
the ratio of physical capital to human capital in the intensive form, where Kt+1 has
to be increased as Ht+1 rises. Thus k
∗ is fixed in equilibrium.
4.2.7 Growth rates
Since the central goal of this section is to analyse the long-run relationship be-
tween non-cognitive skills and growth, we assume that the economy has already
arrived at a balanced growth path. Therefore we focus on the balanced growth
property of this economy. The growth rate of physical capital is as follows:
1 + ρ∗ =
Kt+1
Kt
=
Ht+1
Ht
= (4.16)[ Aβ(1− α)
1 + β(1− η
1+β
)α
]α(1−υ)
1−αυ
[
Dυ(
η
1 + β
)γυ
[
AB(1− η
1 + β
)1−α
]1−υ] 1−α1−αυ
(1− τL)
α(1−υ)
1−αυ
{[
ατK + (1− α)(τL − θ(1− η)(1− τL)
(1− η + β)(1− θ))
]ω[(1− α)(1− η)(1− τL)
(1− η + β)(1− θ)
]1−ω} (1−α)(1−υ)
1−αυ
Eq. (4.16) is the balanced growth rate, which depend on a standard expression
of the productivity parameters in the goods and human capital production, the
relative importance of material investment in human capital production, the relative
preference for parenting time in an individual’s utility function and the private
discount factor. It finds that ρ∗ has only an ambiguous relationship with policy
variables and psychological parameters. Therefore, the later section uses benchmark
parameterisation to present the comparative static in this section.
In this model government spending is productive, as it contributes to the produc-
tion of human capital. Thus, the endogenous growth is partly driven by government
spending. Setting ω = 0 shuts down this source of growth.
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4.3 The planning problem
4.3.1 Environment
In the centralised version of the model, this section considers a central planner
who chooses the allocation of output in order to maximise the present discounted
value of current and future generations. In this economy, the social planner looks at
the exact time period t and considers whole generations (De La Croix and Michel,
2002). This paper assumes that the central planner’s discount factor β˜ equals the
private discount factor β to focus on our main interest in optimal taxation, so the
social welfare function takes the following form:
∞∑
t=0
βt[(1− η)lnZt + lnXt + ηlnφt] (4.17)
The resource constraints of physical and human capital are as follows:
Kt+1 = Ft − Zt −Xt −Gt (4.18a)
Ht+1 = (BGt
ωZt
1−ω)1−υ(Dφt
γHt)
υ (4.18b)
where Ft ≡ F (Kt, (Ht, Lt))
4.3.2 General equilibrium
Writing social planner problem in Lagrange form to yield the Optimality leads to
the maximum of Lt with respect to Zt, Xt, φt, Gt, Kt and Ht. Based on De La Croix
and Michel (2002), Lt equals the sum of the current utilities and the increase in the
shadow value of the capital stock: βqt+1Kt+1 − qtKt and βµt+1Ht+1 − µtHt, and
assuming β = β˜, i.e.
Lt = (1− η)lnZt + lnXt + ηlnφt
+ βqt+1[AKt
α(HtLt)
1−α − Zt −Xt −Gt]− qtKt
+ βµt+1[(BGt
ωZt
1−ω)1−υ(Dφt
γHt)
υ]− µtHt (4.19)
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First-order conditions for an interior solution (assuming it exists) are as follows:
∂Lt
∂Zt
=
1− η
Zt
− βqt+1 + βµt+1Ht+1(1− υ)(1− ω)
Zt
= 0 (4.20a)
∂Lt
∂Xt
=
1
Xt
− βqt+1 = 0 (4.20b)
∂Lt
∂φt
=
η
φt
− βqt+1(1− α) Ft
1− φt + βµt+1Ht+1
υγ
φt
= 0 (4.20c)
∂Lt
∂Gt
= −βqt+1 + βµt+1(1− υ)ωHt+1
Gt
= 0 (4.20d)
∂Lt
∂Kt
= βqt+1F
′
t − qt = 0 (4.20e)
∂Lt
∂Ht
= βqt+1(1− α) Yt
Ht
+ βµt+1υ
Ht+1
Ht
− µt = 0 (4.20f)
where β is the planner’s discount factor, or social discount factor. When utilities are
bounded, the assumption that β is smaller than 1 ensures that objective function is
finite (i.e.
∑∞
t=0 βt <∞). These conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimally
of the constant path starting at k0, as this path satisfies the transversality condition.
Eq. (4.20a) is the optimal allocation of material investment in children. Eq.
(4.20b) indicates that the consumption of the old generation is equal to the next
period of shadow price multiplies discount factor, describing the optimal allocation
of the old generation. Eq. (4.20c) reveals that the marginal utility of material in-
vestment in children corrected to parenting time is equalised to the marginal utility
of the old generation’s consumption. Eq. (4.20c) also indicates that marginal pro-
ductivity of parenting time on the production of human capital corrected to the
marginal productivity of parenting time on goods production function. This result
indicates that the substitution relationship between the production of human cap-
ital and goods production exists, hence a parent invests parenting time in children
to the level when loss in the labour supply is equal to the gain in the (altruism-
factor) discounted future marginal productivity of parenting time which arises from
children’s human-capital accumulation. Eq. (4.20d) determines the optimal govern-
ment spending on education. Eqs. (4.20e) and (4.20f) are the resource constraints
of physical capital and human capital, respectively. Note that, contrary to the stan-
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dard Diamond (1965) model, this planner’s first-order condition does not respect the
first-order condition the individual chooses for himself in a decentralised economy.
Using qt+1Yt = qtKt/αβ and (4.20a)-(4.20f), one finds that the optimal parenting
time is a time-invariant variable as
φ =
η(αβ − 1)(1− βυ) + β(1− α)[η(1− υ)− υγ(2− η)]
(1− α)(2− η)[βυ(1− γ)− 1] + η[(αβ − 1)(1− βυ) + β(1− α)(1− υ)]
(4.21)
One can use (4.20a)-(4.20f) to observe material investment in children as follows:
Zt =Ft
[
γυ(αβ − 1) + (1− α)(1− υ) φ
1− φ
] 1− η − η(1−υ)(1−ω)υγ
η(1− υ)− υγ(2− η)
+ Ft
φ
1− φ
(1− α)(1− υ)(1− ω)
υγ
(4.22)
Here, we require that the material investment in children is strictly positive.
One can observe consumption in old age as
Xt = Ft
γυ(αβ − 1) + (1− α)(1− υ) φ
1−φ
η(1− υ)− υγ(2− η) (4.23)
This section requires that consumption in old age is strictly positive.
One can use first-order conditions and (4.21) to calculate the optimal government
spending on education:
Gt = Ft
(1− υ)ω
η(1− υ)− υγ(2− η)
{
η(1− αβ)− φ
1− φ(1− α)(2− η)
}
(4.24)
Finally, using the first-order conditions, one can obtain
Kt+1 = Ftαβ (4.25)
With the definition of kt ≡ Kt/Ht, one can make the following definition:
Definition 4. For given H0 and K0, an efficient allocation is the path
{Zt, Xt, φt, Gt, kt, wt, rt}t≥0 that satisfies government budget constraints (4.7), the
production of human capital (4.3), the firm’s optimisation conditions (4.9) and
(4.10) and the agent’s optimisation conditions (4.12a) - (4.12c).
60
4.3.3 Balanced growth properties
In balanced growth path, the transformation variable remains at same level. This
yields kt+1 = kt = k
∗. Rewriting (4.25), one yields
k∗ = Γ
1
1−αυ (4.26)
where Γ ≡ Aυ(1− φ)(1−α)υαβ. Equation (4.26) characterises balanced-growth-path
physical to human capital ratio in efficient allocations. If the planner assigns more
social weight to future generations (a larger β˜), there is a larger optimal effective
physical-human capital ratio in the long run. However the ratio is smaller when φ
is higher. The logic is that higher time investment leads to slower accumulation of
physical capital. Therefore, the k∗ is smaller.
4.3.4 Growth rates
Substituting (4.26) into (4.25) and divided by Kt, the growth rates in efficient
allocations take the following form:
1 + % = αβAkt
α−1(1− φt)1−α (4.27)
Eq. (4.27) is the balanced growth rates, which depend on a standard expression
of the productivity parameters in the production of goods and human capital, the
relative importance of material investment in human capital production, the impor-
tance of parenting time in an agent’s utility function and the subjective discount
factor. We find that higher time investment decreases the growth rate. The reason
is that higher time investment causes lower accumulation of physical capital, so the
growth rate declines.
4.4 Optimal taxation
The dynamic optimal taxation problem, referred to as the Ramsey problem, is
one of the most fundamental and influential policy problems. In this problem, the
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government chooses its tax policy to maximise households’ welfare by taking into
account the equilibrium reaction of private agents to the tax policy.
Two approaches have been used to solve the problem: the primal and the dual.
In the primal, we eliminate taxes and prices, so that the government can be thought
of as directly using the quantities as controls. In the dual, the government uses
the tax rates or prices as controls. The literature having “fully” solved the Ramsey
problem (by full solution, we mean not only the above celebrated qualitative result
but also a quantitative solution of the whole optimal path) have used the primal
approach. We are not aware of a full solution to a dual problem. This is because,
as is widely recognised (Jones et al., 1997), the primal is considerably simpler than
the dual.
One important aspect of the OLG model is that the competitive equilibrium
need not be efficient, in contrast to the representative agent models where the First
Welfare Theorem guarantees Pareto efficiency. The reason behind this is that, with
an infinite number of agents in the economy, the total value of resources is infinite,
so Pareto improvements can be made by transferring resources from each young
generation to the current old generation. Another attribute of the OLG type models
is that it is possible that ’over-saving’ can occur when capital accumulation is added
to the model, a situation that a social planner could improve by forcing households to
draw down their capital stocks. Thus, this section will study the efficient allocations.
In this section, we characterise the optimal policy in order to implement the social
planner (hereafter, SP) allocation. Comparing competitive-equilibrium allocations
and efficient allocations, we have
τK = 1 +
1
Aα(1− φ)1−αψ α−11−αυ
(4.28)
where ψ ≡ Aβ(1−α)(1−τL)
σ(1+β)(1−φ)α , σ ≡ [AB(1 − φ)1−αgωz1−ω]1−υDυφγυ , g ≡ ατK + (1 −
α)[τL − θ(1−η)(1−τL)(1−η+β)(1−θ) ] and z ≡ (1−α)(1−η)(1−τL)(1−η+β)(1−θ) . Appendix E details the derivation of
(4.28). One must notice that (4.28) is the non-linear solution for τK , because there
are τK , τL and θ in the RHS. Being unable to directly control the amount of time
that parents devote to their children, the government affects the agents’ incentives
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to engage in labour market activities in order to influence the time they spend with
their children.
Comparing competitive-equilibrium allocations and efficient allocations, we then
formulate the following equations:
1− θ = 1− η
[ 1
Aα(1−φ)1−αψ
α−1
1−αυ
+ (1− τK)][1− η + β∆(1− υ)(1− ω)] (4.29)
1− τL = 1
[ 1
Aα(1−φ)1−αψ
α−1
1−αυ
+ (1− τK)][1 + β∆υγη ]
(4.30)
where ∆ ≡ (1−α)
(1−βυ)
(1−φ)[η(1−υ)−υγ(2−η)]
(αβ−1)(1−φ)υγ+φ(1−α)(1−υ) . Note (4.29) and (4.30) are two non-linear
equations for θ and τL, and there are still τL, τK and θ in the RHS. It is impossible
to solve (4.29) and (4.30), though this section tries to simplify (4.29) and (4.30).
But one can observe the sign of θ and τL which depends on the η(1− υ)− υγ(2− η)
and (αβ − 1)(1− φ)γυ + (1− α)φ(1− υ).
However, using a richer than is possible in a theoretical analysis but means
one can rely on numerical analysis to generate results. The next section will use
numerical simulation to find the signs of labour and capital income taxation and the
subsidies rate to material investment.
4.5 Numerical simulation
Table 4.1 gives the variables and parameters used in this paper.
4.5.1 Benchmark values of parameters
According to Dhont and Heylen (2008), the average tax rates on labour income
and capital income in 1995 and 2001 in the US are 0.347 and 0.393, respectively.
Parameter θ determines the subsidies rate on material investment in children. Cau-
cutt and Lochner (2012) uses data from the Children of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth to point out the parameter g (i.e. the ratio of government spend-
ing on education to output) is approximately 0.072, hence θ is chosen to be 0.5459
subject to the government running balanced budget constraints.
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Variables
Material investment Zt
Time investment φt
Consumption in retirement Xt+1
Labour supply Lt
Wage rate wt
Saving St
Human capital Ht
Cognitive skills Hc,t
Non-cognitive skills Hnc,t
Output Yt
Physical capital Kt
Profit of firms pit
Government spending in education Gt
Parameters
Capital share of production α
Private discount factor β
Relative importance of parenting time γ
Relative importance of government spending ω
Subsidies on material investment in children θ
Relative preference between material and time investment η
Weight of non-cognitive skills υ
Exogenous productivity in the goods production A
Exogenous productivity in the production of cognitive skills B
Exogenous productivity in the production of non-cognitive skills D
Social discount factor β˜
Table 4.1: Variables and parameters
For the relative importance of material investment in children and government
spending on education in the accumulation of cognitive skills, ω, there is no study
that calibrates it. Assuming Gt is equally important to Zt in the accumulation of
cognitive skills, this paper sets up ω as 0.5. To this end, we have to assign a value
to the parameters of the model. Appendix F presents the details of the calibration.
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the values assigned to some parameters and of the
methodology adopted to set the others.
4.5.2 Optimal taxation
We compute the optimal policies and present the results in Table 4.3. In the
first column, we report the results of the simulation performed in a standard model
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Assigned parameters
Labour income tax rates τL 0.347 Dhont and Heylen (2008)
Capital income tax rates τK 0.393 Dhont and Heylen (2008)
Capital share of production α 0.33 Empirical researches
Private discount factor β 0.6095 De La Croix and Doepke (2003)
Calibrated parameters Targeting
Weight of government spending on education ω 0.5
Importance of parenting time γ 0.5
Relative preference between material and time
investment
η 0.25 Craig (2005), time investment
is 0.15
Weight of non-cognitive skills in the human capital
production
υ 0.75 Cunha and Heckman (2007),
human capital production
Subsidies on material investment in children θ 0.5459 Caucutt and Lochner (2012)
Productivity in the goods sector A 5.8229 growth rates is 2 %
Productivity in the cognitive skills production B 2.0417 growth rates is 2 %
Productivity in the non-cognitive skills production D 2.0417 growth rates is 2 %
Table 4.2: Parametrisation
Standard Quality optimised
Capital income tax rate τK 0.393 0.453
Subsidies on material investment θ 0.25 0.59
Labour income tax rate τL 0.347 0.3243
Table 4.3: Optimal policies
Notes: (4.28)-(4.30) are the non-linear equations to provide the solutions for τL, τK , and θ. It is
impossible to solve them directly. However we can solve for (4.20c), then we can get to solutions for
(4.29) and (4.30). For solving (4.20c), we find the sign depends on ατK+(1−α)[τL− θ(1−η)(1−τL)(1−η+β)(1−θ) ].
In this case, we have to use τL in the standard model and τK is 0.453 to solve θ. In the second
column, we use θ = 0.59 and τK is 0.453 to calculate τL.
in which the tax rates and subsidies are entirely exogenous. In the second column,
we include the government’s policy instruments. The comparison of the optimal
policies across the different cases allows us to isolate the roles played by optimal
taxation, which are the novelties of our model.
We first highlight that the main difference in results between the standard model
and ours is the degree of subsidisation of government spending on education. Also,
the marginal income tax rates change, though to a smaller extent. This shows that
it is the direct instrument of taxing/subsidising the parental investment which that
is mostly affected by the intergenerational externality in the skill transmission.
There are two observations from the numerical simulations. First, we see that
τK can be positive or negative to justify the over- or under-accumulation fn physical
65
capital. Since (1−α)(1−η)(1−τL)
(1−η+β)(1−θ) is positive, the sign of τK depends on the sign of
ατK + (1 − α)(τL − θ(1−η)(1−τL)(1−η+β)(1−θ)). Second, the baseline and robustness check shows
that η(1− υ)− υγ(2− η) and (αβ− 1)(1− η/(1 + β))γυ+ [(1−α)(1− υ)η]/(1 + β)
have the same sign. This gives the signs of τL and θ as positive. For example, under
τK = 0.453 and τL = 0.347, we can have θ = 0.59. With τK as 0.453 and θ as 0.59,
the labour income tax rate is 0.3243. If we set τK as 0.4, τL will be 0.2651 and θ will
be 0.5301. This implication means the government should reduce capital income tax
rates and labour income tax rates to subsidise more material investment to justify
dynamical efficiency in a competitive equilibrium.
4.6 Conclusion
There is a long-standing debate on the effects of labour income taxation. In
this paper, we identify a new channel through which income taxation and subsidies
affect growth. If parental investment influences the quality of the early childhood
environment, and if this environment is an input of the human capital production
function, then changes in taxation also affect human capital accumulation through
their impact on parental investment choices.
This paper studies the suboptimality of physical and human capital accumu-
lation in a three-period OLG model with consumption externalities and altruism.
The purpose of this paper is to study optimal taxation and the allocation of pub-
lic resources along with material investment and parenting time. The analysis is
based on an endogenous growth model with two key features: material investment
in children and government spending, and how theses affect the accumulation of
cognitive skills, while parenting time influences the accumulation of non-cognitive
skills. Government spending and subsidies to material investment are financed by
labour and capital income taxation.
Optimal taxation is examined in order for the equilibrium to attain the first-
best solution. With the assumption that private weight equals social weight, the
government should reduce capital income tax rates and labour income tax rates to
subsidise greater material investment to justify the dynamical efficiency in a com-
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petitive equilibrium. Labour income taxation and subsidies in material investment
are positive to implement the dynamical efficiency.
67
Chapter 5
Growth- and welfare-maximising
taxation
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of income taxation and the subsidies on growth
and welfare in an OLG model in which parental investment in skill formation plays a
role in the production of human capital. Policy simulations reveal that higher labour
and capital income tax rates both rise growth rates. In contrast, growth rates are
negatively related to the subsidies in material investment. In the benchmark calibra-
tion, the best welfare-maximising policy reforms an increase government spending
on education funded by higher labour income tax rates.
Keywords : Endogenous growth, Tax structure, Tax rates estimates
68
5.1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine the effects of income taxation and the subsidies on the
growth and welfare in an overlapping generations model in which parental investment
in skill formation plays a role in the production of human capital as complements.
The quality of the early childhood environment depends on parental investment. By
parental investment, we mean parenting time and material investment (e.g. private
spending on education). Parental investment plays a role in the process of skill
formation because it affects the quality of the early childhood environment, which
influences the growth rate of the economy.
Recent growth theories have emphasised the important role of government spend-
ing on education (King and Rebelo, 1990; Pecorino, 1993). Analysing tax structure
is helpful to understand the growth-maximising taxation (Sørensen, 1994). Dual
income systems are introduced in the Nordic countries in the late 1980s and early
1990s, but other countries have moved in a similar direction in pursuit of the more
lenient taxation of capital items; see Sørensen (2005) for details of dual income
taxation. Crawford and Freedman (2008) proposes the versions of dual income tax
schedules as candidates for a future tax system in the UK. Bø et al. (2012) argues
that horizontal inequity (henceforth, HI) measurement in the case of a two-rate tax
system, such as the dual income tax system, both highlights and pinpoints the con-
cept of HI. Treating public spending in the literature of growth has a long-standing
debate. A series of contributions, following an early paper by Barro (1990), treat
public spending as a flow (Fiaschi, 1999; Turnovsky, 1996). By contrast, contri-
butions by Dasgupta (1999) treats public spending as a stock. These studies have
provided much insight into the determinants of welfare-maximising shares of public
spending or investment in infrastructure. Moreover, studies have shown that flow
and stock specifications yield qualitatively similar results in some cases. The set of
tax rates maximises welfare, subject to the government revenue budget. However,
an integral part of human capital accumulation not only depends on government
spending on education, but also parental investment in skills formation (Cunha and
Heckman, 2008; Heckman and Mosso, 2014). Insofar as distortionary taxes interfere
in the private decision to save and invest, they may very well change the accumu-
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lation process of capital, and thus alter the growth rates of the economy (Casarico
and Sommacal, 2012). Yet, despite how the contribution of government spending
on education affects the production of human capital, little theoretical work links
government spending on education and parenting time on skill accumulation. This
paper helps to fill a gap in the literature by developing a conceptual framework for
analysing the impact of government spending on education and parental investment
in skill accumulation on long-run growth and social welfare.
This paper develops a three-period OLG endogenous growth model. Agents
live for three periods: childhood, parenthood and retirement. In the first period,
the child receives subsided material investment by the government and time invest-
ment. Material investment contains government spending on education and private
material resources, whereas time investment involves parenting time. In the second
period, the agent determines how much after-tax labour income to contributes to
child and savings, and how much time to devote to parenting time and labour sup-
ply. This paper also assumes that parents derive the utility from parenting. In the
third period, the agent retires and consumes all the after-tax income.
This paper first focuses on the effect of income taxation and subsidies on growth.
The income tax structure refers to the mix of taxes on the earnings from physical
and human capital that satisfies the government’s budget constraints. This work
follows Rebelo (1991) and Age´nor (2008) by presenting a convex model of growth
in which human capital is added to a standard neoclassical model. Assuming that
both human and physical capital are produced with constant returns to scale in
produced inputs, this model results in unending growth. The net effect of income
taxation is to reduce the growth rates below its efficient value. The set of tax rates
maximises the growth, but is subject to the government revenue constraint. The
setting minimises the growth rates distortion. The growth-maximising tax structure
is found to depend upon the household sector, relative to the human capital and
goods production sector as a whole. Minimising the growth rates distortion will not
necessarily maximise welfare due to distortions of the labour-leisure decision and
the factor ratios employed in the productive sectors of the economy. By considering
the policy implications of the model in a competitive equilibrium, the simulation re-
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sults indicate that a rise in subsidised material investment in children can decrease
growth rates. On the other hand, raising capital income tax rates and labour income
tax rates both benefit growth rates. The simulation of growth-maximising outcomes
indicates that the greater relative importance of government spending in cognitive
skills strengthens the impact of labour income taxation, subsidies in material in-
vestments and capital income taxation on growth rates. In contrast, three scenarios
weaken the impacts of labour income taxation, subsidies in material investment and
capital income taxation on growth rates: the increasing relative marginal produc-
tivity of non-cognitive skills in the production of human capital, parents having
stronger preferences toward parenting time and the higher importance of parenting
time, respectively.
Moreover, at the chosen parameter values, the simulation results of the social
welfare analysis show that funding government spending on education is welfare-
improving, even when funded by higher taxes. The best policy reform in the bench-
mark case is to increase government spending on education by increasing labour
income tax rates. The reason is that labour income taxation is the most important
source in the ratio of government spending on education to output. However, an
increase in the subsidies to material investment by cutting the public spending on
education is the most harmful policy for social welfare. The logic is that a higher
subsidies rate implies more material investment in children. This increase of mate-
rial investment means that the consumption in retirement falls. When the decrease
in retirement consumption is greater than the increase of material investment, there
is a reduction in social welfare.
Section 2 analyses the effect of the tax structure on growth and welfare, Section
3 presents the numerical simulations and Section 4 concludes.
5.2 The model
We develop an OLG model with intragenerational homogeneity and endogenous
growth driven by human capital accumulation. In this model, agents have perfect
foresight about future variables. They live for three distinct periods: childhood, par-
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enthood and retirement. The population is constant, and the size of each generation
equals to N. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a small open economy.
In the first period, the agent receives parenting time and material investment
in schooling. In the second period, the agent has one child and decides how much
to consume and save and how much time to devote to labour, and the child. The
child requires a given time period of care. In the third period, the agent retires and
consumes all income.
In line with Cunha and Heckman (2007), we assume that the parents make
no decision on their own human capital accumulation. In particular, we abstract
from the role of formal schooling on the accumulation of human capital, because we
want to study the repercussions of parental investment on growth, focusing on the
skills formation as the main transmission mechanism, this having been inadequately
addressed by existing theoretical work.
5.2.1 Human capital production function
This paper considers the importance of government spending on education Gt
and parental investment in the material resource (Zt, e.g. private spending on
education) of cognitive skills:
Hc,t = BGt
ωZt
1−ω (5.1)
where the variable B is exogenous productivity. Parameter ω determines the relative
importance of government spending on education and material investment in the
accumulation of cognitive skills.
The production of non-cognitive skills takes the following form:
Hnc,t = Dφt
γHt (5.2)
where D is exogenous productivity. Parameter γ represents the importance of par-
enting time. φt is parenting time. Ht is parents’ human capital.
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The production of human capital is described in the following manner:
Ht+1 = Hc,t
1−υHnc,tυ (5.3)
where parameter υ represents the relative importance of cognitive and non-cognitive
skills in the production of human capital. Here, we note that the human capital
does not fully depreciate. If we take log form of (5.3), we find that lnHt+1 =
(1− υ)lnHc + υlnHt + υlnDφtγ. Then we set that the depreciation rate of human
capital δH is (1−υ) to focus on skill formation as the main transmission mechanism.
5.2.2 Goods production
This production function in the goods sector takes the following form:
Yt = AKt
α(LtHt)
1−α (5.4)
where Yt and Kt represent the total output and physical capital, respectively. A is
the total factor productivity. Parameter α and 1−α are the elasticity of production
in terms of physical capital and human capital, respectively. Lt determines the time
spent on supplying labour to the market.
5.2.3 Household
The model assumes warm-glow altruism in the agent’s utility. This paper takes
log arithmetic preference to ensure that income and substitute effect exactly cancel
each other out, so that changes in the interest rate do no affect on the saving rate.
We assume parents do not derive their utility from their own consumption in adult
age but enjoy parenting time and material investment in children. Appendix B
provides the version of the model where parents derive the utility from their own
consumption in adulthood. Therefore, the utility function is given by
Ut = (1− η)lnZt + βlnXt+1 + ηlnφt, 0 < η < 1 (5.5)
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where parameter β is the time discount factor (i.e. patience). Xt+1 is consumption
in retirement. Parameter η represents the the relative preference for parenting time.
A working agent distributes after-tax labour income wtHt among material in-
vestment Zt and savings St, where wt is the real wage rate and Ht is parent’s human
captial. Moreover, when the agent receives the return from savings and allocates it
to consumption Xt+1. Therefore, the agent’s budget constraints in adulthood and
retirement are
(1− θ)Zt + St = (1− τL)(1− φt)wtHt (5.6a)
Xt+1 = [1 + (1− τk)rt+1]St (5.6b)
Lt + φt = 1 (5.6c)
where variable θ is the subsidies to material investment in children. Variables τL
and τK are the labour and capital income tax rates. Variable rt+1 is rental rate of
physical capital.
5.2.4 Revenue-neutral government spending
The government has at its disposal the following policy instruments: government
spending on education, subsidise to parents’ material investment in children, taxes
on labour income and capital income taxation. In line with Caucutt and Lochner
(2012), we assume that the government runs a balanced budget and funds subsidies
and education spending from the tax revenues:
θZt +Gt = τLwtHtLt + τKrtKt (5.7)
This subsection takes parameters τL, τK and θ as the exogenous policy variables.
The balanced-growth-path (henceforth, BGP) effects and transitional dynamics
associated with revenue-neutral changes in spending shares are straightforward to
analyse in the present setting. In particular, increases in labour income tax rate
τL and capital income tax rate τK lead to a higher subsidies to material invest-
ment in children. While material investment increases due to the higher subsidies,
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the parenting time decreases according to higher tax rates. Therefore, θ has only
an ambiguous effect on the BGP growth rates. This result is summarised in the
following proposition:
Proposition 5. With the balanced budget, an increase in the tax rates and the
subsidies in material investment has an ambiguous effect on the balanced-growth-
path growth rates. If non-cognitive skills do not affect human capital production
(υ = 0), the net effect of revenue-neutral government spending depends only on ω.
With υ > 0, the net effect also depends on υ.
To understand the intuition behind these results, consider the first case where
υ = 0. Human capital only replies on cognitive skills. While government spending on
education increases the growth rates, increased government spending on education
requires higher labour or capital tax rates, or lower subsidies in material investment.
This indicates stock of material investment is lower, and this reduces growth rates.
Therefore, the net effect only depends on ω.
The second case, υ > 0, suggests that the higher fraction of government spending
on education (for a given stock of educated labour) increases the marginal product
of human capital, which in turn raises BGP growth. However the change is revenue
neutral, so the ratio of educated labour-physical capital unambiguously falls. Thus,
the positive effect of the increase in the share of spending on infrastructure is ac-
companied by a lower material investment, which tends to lower the production of
human capital and reduce growth rates. In contrast, if non-cognitive skills dominate
cognitive skills in skill accumulation, the net effect on output and the growth rates
depends on how ‘productive’ the two inputs are in relative terms, that is, on the
relative importance of non-cognitive skills in human capital accumulation.
5.2.5 First-order conditions
The firm’s optimisation problem
The firm determines the demand of physical capital and human capital by max-
imising its profit pit with given factor prices of wage and rent, which are determined
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under a competitive market. The firm’s profit-maximisation problem is as follows:
max
Kt,Ht
pit = AK
α
t (LtHt)
1−α − wtLtHt − rtKt (5.8)
.
The rental rate of physical capital is given by
rt = AαK
α−1
t (LtHt)
1−α (5.9)
Eq. (5.9) states that the interest rate equals the marginal productivity of capital.
The real wage rate per unit of human capital is given by
wt = A(1− α)Kαt (LtHt)−α (5.10)
Eq. (5.10) requires that the wage per efficiency unit equals the marginal productivity
of aggregate labour in efficiency units.
The agent’s optimisation problem
One can form a Lagrange function to solve the agent’s optimisation problem:
Lt =(1− η)lnZt + βlnXt+1 + ηlnφt
+ λt
{
(1− φt)wtHt − Zt − Xt+1
[1 + rt+1]
}
(5.11)
where λt is the shadow price of physical capital.
First-order conditions for an interior solution with respect to Zt, Xt+1, φt are
Zt =
(1− η)(1− τL)
(1 + β)(1− θ) Htwt (5.12a)
Xt+1 =
β[1 + (1− τK)rt+1](1− τL)
1 + β
Htwt (5.12b)
φt =
η
1 + β
(5.12c)
Eq. (5.12a) gives the equilibrium allocation of material investment in children. Eq.
(5.12b) is the optimal consumption in old age. Eq. (5.12c) reflects the optimum
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choices of parenting time. (5.12b) finds that parenting time only depends on patience
and the strength of altruism; the relative preference for parenting time increases
parenting time.
One can use (5.9) and (5.10) to rewrite (5.12a) as
Zt = zYt (5.13)
where z ≡ [(1− α)(1− η)(1− τL)]/[(1− η + β)(1− θ)]. z represents the proportion
of material investment to output.
Plugging the rental rate of physical capital, the real wage rate of human capital,
the equilibrium and (5.13), one observes
Gt = gYt (5.14)
where g ≡ ατK + (1− α)[τL − θ(1− η)(1− τL)/(1− η + β)(1− θ)], g is the ratio of
government spending on education to aggregate output.
5.2.6 Balanced growth path
We assume the current physical capital stock Kt is fully depreciated at the end of
the current period. In a balanced growth path, the transformation variable remains
at the same level. This yields kt+1 = kt = k
∗. It is straightforward to verify that
there exists a unique steady state. Solving for k∗ yields
k∗ = ψ
1
1−αυ (5.15)
where ψ is the collection of parameters, and ψ ≡ Aβ(1−α)(1−τL)/σ(1+β)(1−φ)α.
σ ≡ [AB(1 − φ)1−αgωc1−ω]1−υDυφγυ. The left-hand side of the equation is exactly
the ratio of physical capital to human capital in the intensive form, where Kt+1 has
to be increased as Ht+1 rises. Thus k
∗ is fixed in equilibrium.
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5.2.7 Growth rates
In a balanced growth equilibrium, physical and human capital stocks grow at
the same rate:
1 + ρ∗ = (5.16)[ Aβ(1− α)
1 + β(1− η
1+β
)α
]α(1−υ)
1−αυ
[
Dυ(
η
1 + β
)γυ
[
AB(1− η
1 + β
)1−α
]1−υ] 1−α1−αυ
(1− τ)α(1−υ)1−αυ
{[
ατK + (1− α)(τ − θ(1− η)(1− τ)
(1− η + β)(1− θ))
]ω[(1− α)(1− η)(1− τ)
(1− η + β)(1− θ)
]1−ω} (1−α)(1−υ)
1−αυ
Eq. (5.16) is the balanced growth rates, which depends on a standard expression
of the productivity parameters in the goods and human capital production, the
relative importance of material and time investment to human capital production,
the importance of parenting time, the subjective private discount factor and policy
variables. The following sections discuss the effects of the policy variables on growth
rates and welfare.
5.3 Growth-maximising taxation
This subsection focuses on the effect of the income tax structure on growth.
The income tax structure refers to the mix of taxes on physical and human capital
earnings which satisfy the government’s budget constraints.
To investigate the impacts of τL, τK and θ on the variables in BGP, one can
perform comparative static analysis based on the BGP solutions. According to
(5.16), τL affects ρ
∗ through the following equation:
1
1 + ρ
∂ρ∗
∂τL
=− α(1− υ)
(1− αυ)(1− τL) −
(1− α)2(1− υ)(1− ω)(1− η)
z(1− αυ)(1− η + β)(1− θ)
+
ω(1− υ)(1− α)2
g(1− αυ)
[
1 +
θ(1− η)
(1− η + β)(1− θ)
]
(5.17)
Eq. (5.17) indicates that the effect of τL on ρ
∗ depends on the ratio of material
investment to output and the ratio of government spending to output. If z > g (i.e.
the ratio of material investment is greater than government spending on education),
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there is a positive impact of τL on ρ
∗. On the other hand, z < g leads to a negative
effect of τL on ρ
∗.
Referring to (5.16), the negative relationship between τK and ρ
∗ can be disen-
tangled as follows:
1
1 + ρ∗
∂ρ∗
∂τK
=
αω(1− υ)(1− α)
g(1− αυ) (5.18)
The influence of τK on ρ
∗ depends on the ratio of government spending on education
to output.
According to (5.16), the change in θ should affect ρ∗ directly:
1
1 + ρ∗
∂ρ∗
∂θ
=
(1− α)2(1− υ)(1− η)(1− τL)
(1− αυ)(1− η + β)(1− θ)2
(1− ω
z
− ω
g
)
(5.19)
Eq. (5.4) finds that the effect of θ on ρ∗ depends on the last term, 1−ω
z
− ω
g
, in which
the relative importance between the material investment and government spending
on education plays a role in determining the sign of (5.4). For instance, if the
material investment is equally important to government spending in cognitive skills
technology, the ratio of material investment to output is greater than the ratio of
government spending to output. This implies that more material investment than
government spending means subsidies for material investment negatively affect the
growth rate.
5.4 Welfare-maximising taxation
This section evaluates the predictions of our models for the welfare cost of this
tax increase. Our objective is to illustrate the general principle that there are larger
welfare effects in endogenous growth models than in the basic and neoclassical model.
The traditional solution to the following maximization problem is
Max
τL,τK ,θ
Ut(Zt, Xt+1, φt)
s. t. θZt +Gt = τLwtHtLt + τKrtKt
(5.20)
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This paper uses an alternative method, in which taxation reform is presented by Re-
belo (1991) and Age´nor (2008) to study the impact of income taxation and subsidies
on social welfare.
Two of the biggest problems arising with numerical endogenous growth models
are the choice of a human capital technology specification and the calibration of its
parameters. In the literature, there is a broad consensus on the production function
of consumption and investment goods. There is, however, no real evidence on the
choice of the production function of human capital. We opt for a simple specification
in which the rate of growth of human capital is a concave function of the time in-
vested in education. In this purpose, we simulate large policy changes and compare
the predictions with endogenous growth for the various parameter sets. There are
two taxes, labour and capital income taxation, and two types of government spend-
ing, subsidies to material investment in children and public spending on education.
The next section provides the simulations for the policy tax reforms.
5.5 Numerical simulations
The economic environment depicted above allows us to simulate the transitory
and long-run effects of policy changes and other exogenous shocks. This simulation
exercise requires calibrating the model, i.e. choosing the values of the parameters
and exogenous variables so as to match a series of empirical moments computed on
US data. It is often argued that one of the main disadvantages of applied general
equilibrium models is the difficulty of calibrating certain parameters. Simulation
results are thus followed by sensitivity analysis. This is especially important for the
endogenous growth models with human capital since there are no established values
on the parameters of the human capital formation technology. Table 5.1 gives the
variables and parameters we used in this paper.
5.5.1 Benchmark values of parameters
According to Dhont and Heylen (2008), the average tax rates on labour income
and capital income from 1995 to 2001 in the US are 0.347 and 0.393, respectively.
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Variables
Material investment Zt
Time investment φt
Consumption in retirement Xt+1
Labour supply Lt
Wage rate wt
Saving St
Human capital Ht
Cognitive skills Hc,t
Non-cognitive skills Hnc,t
Output Yt
Physical capital Kt
Profit of firms pit
Government spending in education Gt
Parameters
Capital share of production α
Private discount factor β
Relative importance of parenting time γ
Relative importance of government spending ω
subsidies to material investment in children θ
Relative preference between material and time investment η
Weight of non-cognitive skills υ
Exogenous productivity in the goods production A
Exogenous productivity in the production of cognitive skills B
Exogenous productivity in the production of non-cognitive skills D
Social discount factor β˜
Table 5.1: Variables and parameters
Parameter θ determines the subsidies rate on material investment in children. Cau-
cutt and Lochner (2012) uses data from the Children of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth to point out the parameter g (the ratio of government spending
on education to aggregate output) is approximately 0.072, hence θ is chosen to be
0.5459 by subject to government running balanced budget constraints.
For the relative importance of material investment in children and government
spending on education in the accumulation of cognitive skills, ω, there is no study
that calibrates this. Assuming Gt is equally important to Zt in the accumulation of
cognitive skills, this paper sets up ω as 0.5. To this end, we have to assign a value
to the parameters of the model: Appendix F presents the details of the calibration.
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the values assigned to some parameters and of the
methodology adopted to set the others.
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Assigned parameters
Labour income tax rates τL 0.347 Dhont and Heylen (2008)
Capital income tax rates τK 0.393 Dhont and Heylen (2008)
Capital share of production α 0.33 Empirical researches
Private discount factor β 0.6095 De La Croix and Doepke (2003)
Calibrated parameters Targeting
Weight of government spending on education ω 0.5
Importance of parenting time γ 0.5
Relative preference between material and time
investment
η 0.25 Craig (2005), time investment
is 0.15
Weight of non-cognitive skills in the human capital
production
υ 0.75 Cunha and Heckman (2007),
human capital production
Subsidies to material investment in children θ 0.5459 Caucutt and Lochner (2012)
Productivity in the goods sector A 5.8229 growth rates is 2 %
Productivity in the cognitive skills production B 2.0417 growth rates is 2 %
Productivity in the non-cognitive skills production D 2.0417 growth rates is 2 %
Table 5.2: Parametrisation
5.5.2 Growth-maximisation taxation
Comparative static analysis
This subsection performs comparative static analysis of labour and capital in-
come taxation and subsidies to material investment with regard to the growth rates
based on the steady state solutions.
τL τK θ
ρ∗ + + -
Table 5.3: Numerical simulation results of decentralised economy
Notes: The impact of labour income taxation is negative to the growth rate. The higher capital
income taxation leads to the higher growth rate. However, the higher subsidies rate to material
investment lowers the growth rate.
Table 5.3 shows that g is smaller than z if ω = 0.5. This result implies that the
proportion of government spending on education is less than material investment in
children. The implication stats that the government distributes the taxation to z
than g to increases growth rates.
Sensitivity analysis
To test the robustness of the results, this subsection performs a sensitivity anal-
ysis on the importance of parenting time γ, the relative importance of non-cognitive
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skills in human capital production υ, the relative importance of public spending on
education in cognitive skills ω, patience β and relative preference for parenting time
in utility function η.
Table 5.4 studies the effects of a 10 percent reduction in labour income taxation,
capital income taxation and subsidies to material investment in children. The elas-
ticity of growth rate ρ∗ to labour income tax rate τL is 1.4059. This implies that a 10
percent reduction in τL leads to ρ
∗ decreasing by 14.059 percent. The elasticity of ρ∗
to the tax rate of capital income τK is 0.5181. A 10 percent reduction in τK results
in a 5.181 percent decrease in ρ∗. Moreover, Table 5.4 shows that the elasticity of
ρ∗ to subsidise rate to material investment θ is -1.5888. This means ρ∗ is increased
by 15.888 percent with a 10 percent lower in θ.
∂ρ∗/∂τL ∂ρ∗/∂τK ∂ρ∗/∂θ
γ = 0.5,
η = 0.25, 1.4059 0.5181 -1.5888
υ = 0.75,
ω = 0.5
Table 5.4: Benchmark case
Notes: The numbers states the effects of a 10 percent reduction namely in labour income taxation,
capital income taxation and subsidies to material investment on the growth rate.
∂ρ∗/∂τL ∂ρ∗/∂τK ∂ρ∗/∂θ
ω = 0.1 -0.1582 0.1238 0.0964
ω = 0.2 0.2882 0.2368 -0.3847
ω = 0.3 0.6960 0.3398 -0.8242
ω = 0.4 1.0678 0.4334 -1.2247
ω = 0.5 1.4059 0.5181 -1.5888
ω = 0.6 1.7125 0.5947 -1.9188
ω = 0.7 1.9898 0.6636 -2.2172
ω = 0.8 2.2397 0.7254 -2.4859
ω = 0.9 2.4641 0.7806 -2.7270
Table 5.5: Sensitivity analysis of the relative importance of government spending in
the cognitive skills production
Notes: ω = 0.5 is the standard case. We notice that the higher relative importance of public
education in human capital accumulation strengths the impact of income taxation and subsidies
on the growth rate. The only exception is ω = 0.1.
We now discuss how our conclusions from the previous subsection change when
we depart from the benchmark of ω, η, γ and υ. Table 5.5 - 5.8 present the results of
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∂ρ∗/∂τL ∂ρ∗/∂τK ∂ρ∗/∂θ
η = 0.1 1.6825 0.5538 -1.9435
η = 0.2 1.5307 0.5410 -1.7445
η = 0.3 1.2728 0.4917 -1.4240
η = 0.4 1.0053 0.4355 -1.0948
η = 0.5 0.7516 0.3801 -0.7838
η = 0.6 0.5175 0.3274 -0.4980
η = 0.7 0.3045 0.2775 -0.2391
η = 0.8 0.1136 0.2300 -0.0089
η = 0.9 -0.0509 0.1822 0.1800
Table 5.6: Sensitivity analysis of the relative preference of parenting time
Notes: η = 0.5 is the standard case. We notice that the higher relative preference for parenting
time in utility weakens the impact of income taxation and subsidies on the growth rate. The only
exception is η = 0.1 and 0.9.
∂ρ∗/∂τL ∂ρ∗/∂τK ∂ρ∗/∂θ
υ = 0.1 5.9955 2.2097 -6.7755
υ = 0.2 5.2376 1.9303 -5.9190
υ = 0.3 4.4925 1.6557 -5.0769
υ = 0.4 3.7637 1.3871 -4.2534
υ = 0.5 3.0555 1.1261 -3.4530
υ = 0.6 2.3723 0.8743 -2.6810
υ = 0.7 1.7193 0.6337 -1.9430
υ = 0.8 1.1021 0.4062 -1.2455
υ = 0.9 0.5268 0.1941 -0.5953
Table 5.7: Sensitivity analysis of the relative importance of non-cognitive skills in
the human capital production
Notes: υ = 0.75 is the standard case. The higher relative importance of non-cognitive skills in
human capital accumulation weakens the impact of income taxation and subsidies on the growth
rate.
sensitivity analysis. We vary each parameter in turn, setting all the others according
to the procedure used in the benchmark case.
For ω, which affects elasticity of substitution between public spending on edu-
cation and material investment in children, we consider values in the interval (0,
1). This demonstrates that an increasing range of percentage in ω strengthens the
positive impact of τL, τK and θ on ρ
∗. The only exception is at ω = 0.1, where τL
has a negative effect on ρ∗ and θ has the opposite effect on ρ∗.
The parameter η clearly plays a role in our analysis because it determines the
relative marginal productivity of cognitive skills versus non-cognitive skills in the
production of human capital. Parents attaching greater preference toward parenting
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∂ρ∗/∂τL ∂ρ∗/∂τK ∂ρ∗/∂θ
γ = 0.5 1.4059 0.5181 -1.5888
γ = 1 0.7549 0.2782 -0.8531
γ = 1.5 0.4054 0.1494 -0.4581
γ = 2 0.2177 0.0802 -0.2460
Table 5.8: Sensitivity analysis of the importance of parenting time
Notes: γ = 0.5 is the standard case. The higher importance of parenting time in human capital
accumulation weakens the impact of income taxation and subsidies on the growth rate.
time strengthens the impacts of τL, τK and θ on growth rates. However, η = 0.9 is
an exception, in which τL has a negative effect on ρ
∗ and θ has the opposite impact
on ρ∗.
For υ, the elasticity of substitution between cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
An increasing range of percentage in ω weakens the impacts of τL, τK and θ on ρ
∗.
The parameter γ is the importance of parenting time in human capital accumulation.
Table 5.8 finds that greater importance of parenting time weakens the effects of τL,
τK and θ on ρ
∗.
5.5.3 Welfare analysis of taxation reforms
This subsection focuses on analysis of social welfare via revenue-neutral tax re-
forms. Due to the complex interrelationship between policy variables, changes in
taxes and subsidies could result in ambiguous effects in the government budget and
complicate the tax reform analysis. To solve this problem, this paper assumes out-
put growth rate is 2 percent and applies the benchmark calibrated parameters listed
in Table (4.1) with the assumption of fixed government expenditure. While many
revenue-neutral reforms are possible, we focus on the following:
Case 1. An increase in θ is funded by an increase 10 percent of τK (i.e. τK
changes from 0.393 to 0.4323).
Case 2. A 10 percent increase of τL (i.e. τL changes from 0.347 to 0.3817) funds
an increase in θ.
Case 3. g is increased by a 10 percent increases in τK .
Case 4. An increase in g is funded by a 10 percent increase in τL.
Case 5. An increase in θ is funded by cutting 10% of g.
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Figure 5.1: Welfare analysis of taxation reforms
Notes: Case 1 is an increase in θ which is funded by an increase 10 percent of τK . Case 2 shows
a 10 percent increase of τL funds an increase in θ. Case 3 represents that g is increased by a 10
percent increases in τK . Case 4 describes how an increase in g is funded by a 10 percent increases
in τL. Case 5 is an increase in θ which is funded by cutting 10% of g.
The results find that funding government spending on education is welfare-
improving, even when funded by higher taxes (see Case 3 and 4). At the same
time, the best policy change is to fund government spending on education by in-
creasing labour income tax rates. This finding is unsurprising, because τL is the
most important source in the ratio of government spending on education to output.
Rising τL gives the largest increase in g. Therefore, increasing τL to fund government
spending on education brings the largest amount of utility to the agent.
Figure (5.1) indicates that Case 1 and 2 show that the benefits of subsidies to
material investment do not outweigh the welfare cost of higher taxes. In addition,
case 5 is the most harmful policy to social welfare. This is a reasonable result,
because a higher subsidies rate implies more material investment in children. This
increase of material investment means that the consumption in retirement falls.
When the decrease in retirement consumption is greater than the increase in material
investment, there is a reduction in social welfare.
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Moreover, we can compare this finding with the results in Table 5.3, which
states that growth-maximising taxation subsidises greater material investment. This
comparison shows that, a revenue-neutral reform leading to higher social welfare
results in a lower growth rate.
5.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to develop a larger computable model with a com-
plete description of the public finance aggregates and to compare configurations with
endogenous growth, which arises in the model because of the accumulation of skills.
Since we know little about skills accumulation in the human capital sector, our first
goal was to study the robustness of the simulation results for various calibrations
of the production function of human capital. We have thus computed three policy
parameters: labour income taxation, capital income taxation and subsidies in ma-
terial investment. The effect on the long-run growth rates is more important when
non-cognitive skills affect future wages.
Casarico and Sommacal (2012) shows that the omission of parenting time can
bias the impacts of income taxation on the growth rate. Additionally, we show
that the impact of income taxation and subsidies on growth depends on the ratio
of material investment to output and the ratio of public education to output. We
also discuss how the magnitude of this bias depends on several model parameters.
The parameters that affect the relative importance of the material investment and
the public spending are very important. For instance, if the material investment is
equally important to government spending in the cognitive skills technology, the ra-
tio of material investment to output is greater than the ratio of government spending
to output. This implies that more material investment than government spending
leads to of subsidies to material investment negatively affecting the growth rate.
The simulation results suggest that the higher share of public spending on edu-
cation in the production of human capital with cognitive skills could lead to labour
income taxation and subsidies to material investments in children strongly affect
growth. The results also suggest that parents having stronger preference for par-
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enting time weakens the effects of the policy variables on growth rates. They also
underline that the higher the marginal productivity of non-cognitive skills in human
capital production, the weaker the impact of tax cuts on growth.
In general, the simulation of growth-maximising outcomes indicates that the
greater relative importance of government spending in cognitive skills strengthens
the impacts of income taxation and subsidies on growth rates. In contrast, an
increasing relative marginal productivity of non-cognitive skills in the production
of human capital weakens the impacts of income taxation and subsidies on growth
rates, as well as parents having stronger preferences for parenting time and higher
importance of parenting time in human capital accumulation.
The simulation of welfare-maximising results finds that funding government
spending on education is welfare-improving, even when it is funded by higher taxes.
The best welfare-maximising policy change is to fund government spending on edu-
cation by increasing labour income tax rates.
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Chapter 6
Addendum
6.1 Social security
In Chapter 3, we identify and explain dynamical inefficiency. We can also follow
the literature to use social security in the capital accumulation to reflect this issue.
This chapter briefly discusses how social security can be introduced to deal with
dynamical inefficiency in the OLG model. Therefore pareto-optimal allocation can
be decentralised with such transfers (Second Welfare Theorem).
De La Croix and Michel (2002) and Acemoglu (2009) document two types
of social security: fully funded system and unfunded (pay-as-you-go, henceforth,
PAYGO) system. The difference between these two systems is that the former taxes
young generation then returns with interest back to the generation in the next pe-
riod. But the later taxes young generation and transfers to old generation directly.
A PAYGO social security system dates back to Diamond (1977). Samuelson (1975)
views the PAYGO pensions as lump-sum transfers that can lead a stationary econ-
omy to the golden rule. As is typical presumed, a PAYGO social security discourages
aggregate savings. However, when there is dynamical inefficiency, discouraging sav-
ings may lead to a Pareto improvement.
Fully funded social security
In a fully funded social security system, the government at date t raises some
amount of funds, Tt, from the young. These funds are invested in the only productive
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asset of the economy, the capital stock, and the workers receive the returns, given
by Rt+1Tt when they are old. Thus the individual maximisation problem under a
fully funded social security system becomes
Max
Zt,Xt+,φt
Ut = lnZt + β lnXt+1 + η lnφt
s. t. Zt + St + Tt = (1− φt)wtHt
Xt+1 = rt+1(St + Tt)
(6.1)
We assume savings are the capital in the next period (i.e. Kt+1 = St). One can
solves the maximum problem to obtain the optimal allocations of Zt, Xt+1, and φt
as follows:
φt =
η
1 + η + β
(6.2a)
Kt+1 =
βw2tH
2
t − (1 + η + β)wtHt + Tt
1 + η + β
(6.2b)
Zt =
(2 + η + β)(wtHt − Tt)− βw2tH2t
1 + η + β
(6.2c)
Equation (6.2a) indicates that the fully funded social security does not affect the
amount of parenting time, which only depends on η and β. (6.2b) shows that the
social security has positive impact to physical capital accumulation. This result also
states physical capital accumulates faster with fully funded social security. In con-
trast, (6.2c) describes the social security has negative effect on material investment
in children. This finding leads to under-accumulation of human capital. With the
assumption of one-period income, these results are reasonable. The logic is that par-
ents allocate labour income into three parts: material investment in children, saving
and social security amount, therefore the new allocation compresses the mount of
material investment in children.
Unfunded social security
In line with Acemoglu (2009), the government collects the fund Bt from the
young at time t and distributes it to the current old with per capita transfer (i.e.
Bt = (1 + n)Bt+1, implying that takes into account that there are more young than
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old because of population growth), but we assume the population growth rates is
zero. Therefore the individual maximisation problem becomes
Max
Zt,Xt+,φt
Ut = lnZt + β lnXt+1 + η lnφt
s. t. Zt + St +Bt = (1− φt)wtHt
Xt+1 = rt+1St +Bt+1
(6.3)
One can observe the following results by solving the maximum problem:
φt =
η(wtHt −Bt + Bt+1rt+1 )
wtHt(1 + η + β)
(6.4a)
Kt+1 =
βwtHt − βBt − (1 + η)Bt+1rt+1
1 + η + β
(6.4b)
Zt =
wtHt − (1 + η + ηβ)Bt + (2η − 1)Bt+1rt+1
1 + η + β
(6.4c)
(6.4a) suggests Bt has negative effect to parenting time, but Bt+1 has the counter
effect. We find that PAYGO can affect parenting time. If the parents receive more
social security in the next period, they give more parenting time. However, if the
government requests more lump-sum tax in t, the agents decrease parenting time.
For physical capital accumulation, the PAYGO social security discourages sav-
ings leading to a Pareto improvement. The reason behind this is social security
requires the income reallocation and compresses saving. However, in unfunded so-
cial security system, the payback relays on the population growth rates. Applying
population into this model could be one of the future researches.
6.2 Parenting style
The development in the early life stage of a child is more important than genes
in explaining the later life outcomes (Jablonka and Raz, 2009). In particular, the
most important feature affecting the later life outcomes is parenting (i.e. rearing)
by parents (Baumrind, 1971; Holmbeck et al., 1995; Maccoby and Martin, 1983).
Greater levels of skills promote social inclusion, promote economic and social mo-
bility, economic productivity and well-being (Heckman and Mosso, 2014).
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Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) develop a theory of parent-child relations that ra-
tionalises the choice between alternative parenting styles. Krueger et al. (2008)
also suggest parenting style can affect the heritability of personality. The parents
maximise an objective function that combines Beckerian altruism and paternalism
towards children. They can affect their children’s choices via two channels: either by
influencing children’s preferences or by imposing direct restrictions on their choice
sets. Different parenting styles (authoritarian, authoritative and permissive) emerge
as equilibrium outcomes and are affected both by parental preferences and by the
socioeconomic environment. Parenting style, in turn, feeds back into the children’s
welfare and economic success. The theory is consistent with the decline of authori-
tarian parenting observed in industrialised countries and with the greater prevalence
of more permissive parenting in countries characterised by low inequality.
Other related papers in this literature includes Bhatt and Ogaki (2012), which
introduces the tough-love model and studies the time-inconsistent decision mak-
ing and temptation. It suggests an increasing material investment in children will
decrease child’s patience.
6.3 Imperfect market
Becker and Tomes (1986) argue that there is no role for initial financial wealth,
parental income, parental utility, or the magnitude of parental altruism in deter-
mining the optimal level of investment, because the parents can borrow freely in the
market to finance the wealth-maximising level of investment. Yet, Heckman and
Mosso (2014) point out the returns to investments are higher for children as the
parents with higher degree of altruism. This is a particular type of market failure
due to the accident of birth that induces a correlation of human capital and earnings
across generations, even in the absence of financial market imperfections. One pos-
sible constraint is the impossibility of borrowing against the child’s future earnings
(Becker and Tomes, 1986).
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) use NLSY 97 data and IV estimates of the re-
turns to schooling to support the existence of substantial credit constraints. Dahl
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and Lochner (2012) use the the evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit to in-
vestigate how credit constraints and family income affect the test scores of children
in early adolescence.
Glomm (1997) argues that the representative individual cannot borrow from the
future to balance the current investment on child, because of borrowing constraint.
Thus, the socioeconomic status can be extended to the discussion of initial wealth
and borrowing constraints.
6.4 Positive psychology
Maslow (1954) and Maslow (1970) introduce the research of positive psychology.
The application of positive psychology can be used in the human capital forma-
tion. For examples, the desire of being aggressive and positive is a self-actualization
(Rogers, 1951). Furthermore, the positive emotion ,e.g. happiness and confidence,
is meaningful in revolution of human being (Fredrickson, 2000).
Having confidence is positively relative to the life satisfied level and earnings, be-
cause a confident person keeps the happy memories and forgets the bad experiences
(Seligman, 2002). Resiliency is positively related to leadership (Bandura, 2000). Op-
timism is considered to involve cognitive, emotional and motivational components
(Peterson, 2000). Moreover, Bandura (1977), Bandura and Cervone (1986) and
Bandura (1996) mention the efficacy expectation of self-ability is a major determent
factor of goal-setting, activities choice and willingness to expend effort. If the indi-
vidual has more self-efficacy, he would raise the inner motivation and enjoy his work.
Hackett and Betz (1981) show that self-efficacy is a personal non-cognitive attitude,
which drives the person to delivery his best effort to achieve the goal. Luthans
(2002) describes self-efficiency as confidence. Therefore, positive psychology could
extend the models in this thesis.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis goes beyond the technology of skill formation to understand the in-
teractions within parenting time, material investments and government spending on
education to shape human capital accumulation. The novelty of our approach to
the application of skill formation and parenting time is the following. We intro-
duce the contribution of parenting time in the production of non-cognitive skills,
and material investment in children along with government spending on education
contribute to the production of cognitive skills. We postulate that the objective of
the agent is maximising the utility with material investment, parenting time and
the consumption in retirement. With this type of preference, the economic agent
needs to consider not only the trade-off between parenting time and working time,
but also the balance between investing on children and increasing the next period
consumption. With the assumption of finite lived agent, there is over- or under-
accumulation in the decentralised market. If this is the case, the optimal taxation
can be introduced into this economy to restore the inefficiency.
The numerical simulations in Chapter 2 show that the higher importance of
parenting time decreases the growth rates. Parents’ stronger preference for material
investment increases the growth rates, as well as the higher relative importance of
cognitive skills in human capital. One notes that the outcome would be the opposite
in a different calibration with different type of altruism, for instances, strategic
altruism or parenting style.
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Chapter 3 uses the simulation results to reveal that, at the certain social weight,
the levels of physical and human capital in a competitive equilibrium are different
from those in the social optimum. Physical and human capital can under- or over-
accumulate in the same or opposite directions depending on the pairs of private and
social discount factor. For example, when private discount factor is low and social
discount factor is high, there are under-accumulated physical and human capital.
On the other hand, there are over-accumulated physical and human capital with
high private discount factor and low social discount factor. In addition, If private
discount factor equals social discount factor, there are over-accumulation of physical
capital and under-accumulation of human capital. Therefore, laissez-faire economy
does coincides with social optimum.
The numerical simulation results in Chapter 4 find the positive optimal labour
income taxation and subsidies in material investment implement the efficient allo-
cations. Capital income is taxed or subsidised depending on labour income taxa-
tion, subsidies to material investment, the relative preference of parenting time and
agent’s private discount factor.
Chapter 5 applies policy simulations in a calibrated model, in which the human
capital counts on cognitive and non-cognitive skills. We find that higher labour and
capital income tax rates both rise the growth rates. In contrast, public subsidies
in material investment has negative impact on the growth rates. In the benchmark
calibration, the best welfare-maximising policy forms with an increase government
spending on education funded by higher labour income tax rates. Chapter 6 finds
pay-as-you-go social security can affect the decision of allocating the parenting time
in children. It suggests the application of parenting style can effect the different
values of the parameters in the model.
This thesis contributes to three distinct strands of literature. First, it contributes
to the large literature of the production of human capital. Whilst the combination
of cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills into production of human capital are
well documented in literature, theoretical works lack the convincing evidence for
any of specific mechanism to distinguish cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills in
analysing a general equilibrium. More specifically, in the model, the agent allocates
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the time devoted to parenting is transformed to higher stock of next generation’s
human capital whereas time into labour supply is translated to higher consumption
in retirement. Furthermore, the agent obtains utility from parenting time. This
setting is different from the one in Del Boca et al. (2013) in which the parent does
not derive utility from parenting time. Therefore this thesis addresses the trade-
off between parenting time and the consumption in retirement, and the balance
between time and material investment in children. It also opens the door for the
study involving intergenerational interaction, such as demonstrate effect (Jellal and
Wolff, 2002), asymmetric information on child’s human capital accumulation or
effort (Akabayashi, 2006), tough-love model (Bhatt and Ogaki, 2012) and parenting
style (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017).
The second contribution is to the literature in dynamical inefficiency with an
overlapping generations model. There is a growing literature evaluating dynamical
efficiency with both physical and human capital. For examples, Boldrin and Montes
(2005) studies suboptimality of both education and saving decisions. Docquier et al.
(2007) stresses the role of intergenerational human capital externalities. Bishnu
(2013) contends a lack of empirical backing for human capital externalities and
instead advocated the importance of consumption externalities. But this thesis
posits a possibility wherein parenting time in non-cognitive skills contributing to
the formation of human capital. Compared to the social optimum, both types of
capital may under- or over-accumulate, or one type under-accumulates and the other
type over-accumulates in the competitive equilibrium, hence laissez-faire economy
coincides with social optimum.
Finally, this thesis contributes the literature in growth- and welfare-maximising
taxation (Altig et al., 2001; Conesa et al., 2009). We firstly examines the the stan-
dard case of labour income tax, capital income tax, subsidies on material investment
in children on the growth rates. In addition, it presents the sensitivity analysis of
different parameter values. We then investigate social welfare analysis by providing
parametrization at the the aggregate level. We also highlights the interaction within
public spending on education, and subsidies to material investment in children when
the agent faces labour income tax and capital income tax.
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This is the first step toward the theoretical application of personality into hu-
man capital accumulation. This study helps explaining how parenting time with
impure altruism affects human capital accumulation. A greater knowledge of the
mechanisms behind the learning is crucial for the design of more effective policies
and interventions. Successful interventions alter parental behavior. Understanding
why this happens, how parenting can be incentivised, and through which channels
parenting influences child development are crucial tasks for the future studies of
importance of parental investment in the production of human capital.
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Appendix A
The relationship between the
parameters and Big Five
According to American Psychological Association Dictionary, Big Five (i.e. OCEAN)
is a taxonomy for personality traits, including (i) Openness to Experience (Intellect)
is the tendency to be open to new aesthetic, cultural or intellectual experiences.
(ii)Conscientiousness is the tendency to be organised, responsible and hardworking.
(iii)Extraversion is an orientation of one’s interests and energies toward the outer
world of people and things rather than the inner world of subjective experience;
characterised by positive affect and sociability. (iv)Agreeableness is the tendency
to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner. (v)Neuroticism (Emotional Stability)
is a chronic level of emotional instability and proneness to psychological distress.
Emotional stability is predictability and consistency in emotional reactions, with
absence of rapid mood changes. These preference parameters are usually applied
into behavioral economics (DellaVigna, 2009).
Time Preference is the preference over consumption in different time periods.
Survey questions and experiments used to elicit time preference can look at Marsh-
mallow Task: participants (usually, children) will get a marshmallow. The examiner
will tell the participants he/she will get one more marshmallow if he/she doesn’t
eat the current one, and examiner will leave the room. Using this Marshmallow
Task to test short-term discounting (Mischel et al., 2011). Example survey ques-
tion is ”How patient are you on a scale from 1 to 10?” (GSOEP, 2008). Empirical
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relationships include Conscientiousness, Self-Control, Affective Mindfulness, Elabo-
ration of Consequences, Consideration of Future Consequences (Daly et al., 2009);
Extraversion, Time Preference (Dohmen et al., 2010); Agreeableness, Inhibitive Side
of Conscientiousness (Anderson et al., 2011).
Risk Aversion is the preference over different states of the risks. Survey ques-
tions and experiments used to elicit risk aversion can look at Devil’s Task (Slovic,
1966): participant chose ten ”switches” in order. Participant is informed that one of
these the switches will make participant lose all previous winnings. The number of
switches chosen is a measure of risk aversion. Example survey question is ”How will-
ing are you to take risks, in general?” (Dohmen et al., 2011). Empirical relationships
contain Sensation Seeking (Eckel and Grossman, 2002; Zuckerman, 1994); Openness
(Dohmen et al., 2010); Neuroticism, Ambition and Agreeableness (Borghans et al.,
2009); Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2003); Neuroticism, Inhibitive
Side of Conscientiousness (Anderson et al., 2011).
Preferences for Leisure is the preference over consumption and leisure. Survey
questions and experiments used to elicit leisure can look at payments for working:
Workers’ reservation wage is their preference for leisure (Borghans et al., 2008).
Empirical relationships have the inconsistency with psychological measures of leisure
preferences (Borghans et al., 2008).
Altruism is an unconditional kindness. Inequity Aversion is the value of equality
in payoffs. Survey questions and experiments used to elicit altruism and inequality
aversion can look at Dictator Game: A ”proposer” has the option to transfer part of
an endowment to a ”responder.” The transfer is used as a measure of pure altruism
(Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Empirical relationships are Neuroticism, Agreeableness
(Ashton et al., 1998; Bekkers, 2006; Osin´ski, 2009).
Almlund et al. (2011) reviews German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP)
to comprise preference and personality measures for a representative sample of more
than 14,000 individuals. It invests the relationship between preference parameter
and Big Five, including how to estimate personality traits, and what are the issues
of estimation. It also shows that how personal traits affect performance in many
distinct areas of economic and social life.
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In concluding, we have the Table A.1 to summarise the relationships between
Big Five and the parameters in the models. Almlund et al. (2011) provides the
comprehensive results, see Table A.2.
Big Five The parameters
Openness υ
Conscientiousness β
Extraversion β
Agreeableness η
Neuroticism η
Table A.1: The relationship between Big Five and the parameters in the model
Notes: The parameter υ is the relative importance between cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
β represents the private discount factor. η determines the relative preference between material
and time investment.
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Appendix B
The consumption in adulthood
B.1 The Model
We develop an OLG model with intragenerational homogeneity and endogenous
growth driven by human capital accumulation. The agent has perfect foresight about
future variables and lives for three periods: childhood, parenthood and retirement.
The population is constant, and the size of each generation is equal to N . For the
sake of simplicity, we assume a small open economy.
In the first period, the agent receives parenting time and material investment in
schooling. In the second period, the agent has one child and decides how much to
consume and savings and how much time to devote to labour and parenting time.
The child requires a certain care time. In the third period, the agent retires and
consumes all income.
This paper assumes the parental investment is endogenous; parents determine
how much labour income to contribute to material investment and savings, and how
much time to devote to parenting time and labour supply. However, we assume the
parents make no decision on their own human capital accumulation. In particular,
we abstract from the role of formal schooling on the accumulation of human capital,
because we want to study the repercussions of parental investment on growth, fo-
cusing on the skills formation as the main transmission mechanism, an issue which
is largely unexplored in the theoretical literature.
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B.1.1 Household
Parents are the dicision maker in the household. The following utility function
describes preferences of an agent born in period t− 1:
Ut = (1− η)lnZt + ηlnφt + lnCt + βlnXt+1, 0 < η < 1 (B.1.1)
where Ct and Xt+1 denote consumption in parenthood/middle age and in retire-
ment/old age, respectively (no consumption takes place during childhood);Zt stands
for the material investment on child (e.g. private education expenditure). The pa-
rameter β is the psychology discount factor (i.e. patience). Parameter η represents
the the relative preference of parenting time.
Assumption 1. Ut is a twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
concave social welfare function.
B.1.2 Human capital production function
This paper considers the importance of government spending on education Gt
and parental investment on the material resource in cognitive skills:
Hc,t = BGt
ωZt
1−ω (B.1.2)
where the variable B is the exogenous productivity. Parameter ω determines the
relative importance of government spending on education and material investments
in the accumulation of cognitive skills.
The production non-cognitive skills takes the following form:
Hnc,t = Dφt
γHt (B.1.3)
where D is the exogenous productivity. Parameter γ represents the importance of
parenting time. φt is the parenting time. Ht is the parents’ human capital.
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The production of human capital is described as follows:
Ht+1 = Hc,t
1−υHnc,tυ (B.1.4)
where parameter υ is the relative importance of cognitive and non-cognitive skills
in the production of human capital. Here we note that the human capital does
not fully depreciate. If we take log form of (B.1.11c), we find that lnHt+1 = (1 −
υ)lnHc + υlnHt + υlnDφt
γ. We set the depreciation rate of human capital δH is
(1− υ) to focus on the skill formation as the main transmission mechanism.
B.1.3 Goods production
The production function in the goods sector takes the following equation:
Yt = AKt
α(LtHt)
1−α (B.1.5)
where Yt and Kt are the total output and physical capital, respectively. A is the
total factor productivity. Parameter α and 1 − α are the elasticity of production
with respect to physical capital and human capital, respectively. Lt determines the
time spent on supplying labour to the market. We normalise parenting time and
working hours are 1 (i.e. Lt + φt = 1).
B.1.4 Government
The government has at its disposal the following policy instruments: government
spending on education, subsidy to parents’ material investment in children, taxes on
labour income and capital income. We assume that the government runs a balanced
budget and funds subsidies and education spending from the tax revenues:
θZt +Gt = τLwtHtLt + τKrtKt (B.1.6)
where θ is subsidy rate to material investment in children. τL and τK represent labour
and capital income tax rates. This subsection takes τL, τK and θ as exogenous.
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B.1.5 Optimisation problems
The firm’s optimisation problem
The firm determines the demand of physical capital and human capital by max-
imising its profit pit with given factor prices of wage and rent, which are determined
under the competitive market:
max
Kt,Ht
pit = AK
α
t (LtHt)
1−α − wtHtLt − rtKt (B.1.7)
The maximisation problem shows the firm sells its goods and pays the rental rate
of physical capital and real wage of human capital.
The rental rate of physical capital is formed by
rt = AαK
α−1
t (LtHt)
1−α (B.1.8)
Eq. (B.1.8) states that interest rate equals the marginal productivity of capital.
The real wage rate per unit of human capital is given by
wt = A(1− α)Kαt (LtHt)−α (B.1.9)
Eq. (B.1.9) requires that the wage per efficiency units equals the marginal produc-
tivity of aggregate labour in efficiency units.
Agent’s optimisation problem
One can form a Lagrange function as follows:
Lt =(1− η)lnZt + ηlnφt + lnCt + βlnXt+1
+ λt
{
(1− τL)(1− φt)wtHt − (1− θ)Zt − Ct − Xt+1
[1 + (1− τK)rt+1]
}
(B.1.10)
First-order conditions for an interior solution (assumes it exists) with respect to
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Zt, Ct, Xt+1, φt and λt are
Zt =
1− η
λt(1− θ) (B.1.11a)
Ct =
1
λt
(B.1.11b)
Xt+1 =
β[1 + (1− τK)rt+1]
λt
(B.1.11c)
φt =
η
λt[(1− τL)Htwt] (B.1.11d)
(1− τL)(1− φt)wtHt − (1− θ)Zt − Xt+1
[1 + (1− τK)rt+1] = 0 (B.1.11e)
Substituting (B.1.11a) - (B.1.11d) into (B.1.11e), one obtains
λt =
2 + β
(1− τL)Htwt (B.1.12)
Equation (B.1.12) indicates the shadow price.
Incorporating equation (B.1.12), equations (B.1.11a) - (B.1.11d) can be rewritten
as follows:
Zt =
(1− η)(1− τL)
(2 + β)(1− θ) Htwt (B.1.13a)
Ct =
(1− τL)wtHt
2 + β
(B.1.13b)
Xt+1 =
β[1 + (1− τK)rt+1](1− τL)
2 + β
Htwt (B.1.13c)
φt =
η
2 + β
(B.1.13d)
Equation (B.1.13a) gives the equilibrium allocation of material investment in chil-
dren. (B.1.13a) also confirms that socioeconomic status affects the material invest-
ment in children directly (Baker et al., 2002; Hout and Dohan, 1996). (B.1.13a)
additionally shows that a reduction in τL increases Zt. Equation (B.1.13c) states
that the optimal consumption in retirement. It also describes the negative impacts
of τL and τK to the consumption in retirement. Equation (B.1.13d) reflects the opti-
mum choices of parenting time. It also finds that the level of altruism and patience
both benefit parenting time.
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One can rewrite (B.1.13a) in the following manner:
Zt = zYt (B.1.14)
where z ≡ [(1− α)(1− η)(1− τL)]/[(2− η + β)(1− θ)].
Observing rt, wt, (B.1.13a), (B.1.13c) and (B.1.13d), one yields
Gt = gYt (B.1.15)
where g ≡ ατK + (1− α)[τL − θ(1−η)(1−τL)(2−η+β)(1−θ) ].
One rewrites equation (B.1.13c) to have
Kt+1 =
β
2 + β
At(1− α)(1− τL)(1− φt)−α(Kt
Ht
)αHt (B.1.16)
One observes human capital production as
Ht+1 = σt(
Kt
Ht
)α(1−υ)Ht (B.1.17)
where σt ≡ [AtBt(1− φt)1−αgωz1−ω]1−υDυt φγυt .
This paper now defines kt as Kt/Ht, the ration of physical capital to human
capital, subjecting to the real wage rate and rental rate of physical capital. One
makes the following equation:
kt+1 = ψtkt
αυ (B.1.18)
where ψt ≡ [Atβ(1− α)(1− τL)]/[σt(2 + β)(1− φt)α].
Definition 1. (Competitive Equilibrium) For given H0 and K0, a competitive
equilibrium is the path {Zt, Ct, Xt, φt, kt, wt, rt, St}t≥0 that satisfies firm’s optimisa-
tion conditions in (B.1.8) and (B.1.9), agent’s optimisation conditions in (B.1.13a)-
(B.1.13d) and the production of human capital in (B.1.2)-(B.1.4).
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B.1.6 Balanced growth properties
Proposition 1. In the canonical OLG with log preferences and Cobb-Douglas
technology, there exists a unique balanced growth path, which physical-human capital
ration k∗ is given by (B.1.19).
In balanced growth path, the allocation in competitive equilibrium {Zt, Ct, Xt, φt,
kt, wt, rt, St} are time-invariant, denoted by {Z∗, C∗, X∗, φ∗, k∗, w∗, r∗, S∗}, i.e. the
transformation variable remains at same level. This yields kt+1 = kt = k
∗. Solving
equation (B.1.18) for k∗ yields
k∗ = ψ
1
1−αυ (B.1.19)
The left-hand side of the equation characterises exactly the ratio of physical capital
to human capital in the intensive form, where Kt+1 has to be increased as Ht+1 rises.
Thus k∗ is fixed in equilibrium.
B.1.7 Growth rates
This subsection focuses on the balanced growth property of this economy. Sub-
stituting (B.1.19) into (B.1.18), the growth rates of physical capital is
1 + ρ∗ =
Kt+1
Kt
=
Ht+1
Ht
=[ Aβ(1− α)
(2 + β)(1− η
2+β
)α
]α(1−υ)
1−αυ
[
Dυ(
η
2 + β
)γυ
[
AB(1− η
2 + β
)1−α
]1−υ] 1−α1−αυ
(1− τL)
α(1−υ)
1−αυ
{[
ατK + (1− α)(τL − θ(1− η)(1− τL)
(2− η + β)(1− θ))
]ω[(1− α)(1− η)(1− τL)
(2− η + β)(1− θ)
]1−ω} (1−α)(1−υ)
1−αυ
(B.1.20)
Equation (B.1.20) is the balanced growth rates.
B.2 Efficient allocations
In building on prior literature, there is dynamically inefficient issue in a compet-
itive equilibrium (Acemoglu, 2009). With limited life time, the agent chooses the
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equilibrium allocation of material investment in children, the consumption in retire-
ment and the parenting time. This section considers a central planner who allocates
the physical and human capital resources to maximise the present discounted value
of current and future generations.
B.2.1 Environment
In the economy, social planner looks at exact time period t, and considers the
whole generations (De La Croix and Michel, 2002). The social welfare function takes
the following form:
∞∑
t=0
ΛtUt(Zt, φt, Ct, Xt+1) (B.2.21)
where Λt is the planner’s discount factor, i.e. social weight that a planner attaches
to the future generations. Following Docquier et al. (2007) and Bishnu (2013), the
sum of lifetime utilities over generations is discounted by a factor Λ ∈ (0, 1). When
utilities are bounded, Λ is smaller than 1 ensures that objective function is finite
(i.e.
∑∞
t=0 Λt < ∞). These conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimally of
the constant path starting at k0, as this path satisfies the transversality conditions.
The social planner’s maximisation problems subject to the resource constraints
of physical and human captial:
Kt+1 = Ft − Zt − Ct −Xt −Gt (B.2.22a)
Ht+1 = (BtGt
ωZt
1−ω)1−υ(Dtφt
γHt)
υ (B.2.22b)
B.2.2 Planner’s optimisation problem
The social planner’s maximum problem in Lagrange form yields
Lt =
∞∑
t=0
β˜t{[(1− η)lnZt + ηlnφt + lnCt + βXt+1]
+ Λqt+1[AtKt
α(HtLt)
1−α − Zt − Ct −Xt −Gt −Kt+1]
+ Λµt+1[(BtGt
ωZt
1−ω)1−υ(Dtφt
γHt)
υ −Ht+1]}
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Optimality leads to the maximum of Lt with respect to Zt, Ct, Xt, φt, Gt, Kt and
Ht. Lt equals the sum of the current utilities and the increase in the shadow value
of the capital stock: Λqt+1Kt+1 − qtKt and Λµt+1Ht+1 − µtHt. We assume Λ = β,
so the social planner’s maximum problem is as follows:
Lt = (1− η)lnZt + lnCt + lnXt + ηlnφt
+ Λqt+1[AtKt
α(HtLt)
1−α − Zt − Ct −Xt −Gt]− qtKt
+ Λµt+1[(BtGt
ωZt
1−ω)1−υ(Dtφt
γHt)
υ]− µtHt (B.2.23)
First-order conditions for an interior solution (assuming it exists) with respect to
{Zt, Ct, Xt, φt, Gt, Kt, Ht}, respectively:
∂Lt
∂Zt
=
1− η
Zt
− Λqt+1 + Λµt+1Ht+1(1− υ)(1− ω)
Zt
= 0 (B.2.24a)
∂Lt
∂Ct
=
1
Ct
− Λqt+1 = 0 (B.2.24b)
∂Lt
∂Xt
=
1
Xt
− Λqt+1 = 0 (B.2.24c)
∂Lt
∂φt
=
η
φt
− Λqt+1(1− α) Ft
1− φt + Λµt+1υγ
Ht+1
φt
= 0 (B.2.24d)
∂Lt
∂Gt
= −Λqt+1 + Λµt+1(1− υ)ωHt+1
Gt
= 0 (B.2.24e)
∂Lt
∂Kt
= Λqt+1F
′
t − qt = 0 (B.2.24f)
∂Lt
∂Ht
= Λqt+1(1− α)Ft
Ht
+ Λµt+1υ
Ht+1
Ht
− µt = 0 (B.2.24g)
These conditions verify the constant quantities, since Λ ∈ (0, 1). Equation (B.2.24a)
is the optimal allocation of material investment in children. Equation (B.2.24c)
states consumption in adulthood. Equation (B.2.24c) indicates that the consump-
tion in retirement equals the next period of shadow price times discount factor.
Equation (B.2.24d) governs that the marginal utility of material investment in chil-
dren corrected to parenting time equals the marginal utility of consumption in retire-
ment. It also reveals that marginal productivity of parenting time on the production
of human capital corrected to the marginal productivity of parenting time on goods
production function. This result shows that the substitution relationship between
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the production of human capital and goods production. Equation (B.2.24e) deter-
mines the optimal spending on education. Equations (B.2.24f) and (B.2.24g) are
the resource constraint of physical capital and human capital of economy, respec-
tively. Contrary to the standard Diamond (1965) model, this planner’s first-order
conditions do not respect the first-order condition the agent chooses for itself in the
competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2. (Sufficient condition for the planner’s optimum) A positive
sequence{Zt, Ct, Xt, φt, Kt+1, Ht+1}t≥0 satisfying (B.2.24a)-(B.2.24g) and the transver-
sality condition limt→∞ ΛtqtKt = 0 and limt→∞ ΛtµtHt = 0 is an optimal solution to
the planner’s problem.
Using (B.2.24f), one obtains
qt+1 =
qt
ΛF ′t
=
qtKt
αΛFt
(B.2.25)
where F ′t = αFt/Kt.
Substituting (B.2.25) into (B.2.24g) to obtain, one can yield
µt+1 =
[qtKt(1− α)
α(1− φt) −
η
φt
] φt
ΛυγHt+1
(B.2.26)
One can plug (B.2.25) and (B.2.26) back into Equation (B.2.24a) to formulate
Zt = αFt
[(1− η)
qtKt
− η(1− υ)(1− ω)
qtKtυγ
+
φt
1− φt
(1− α)(1− υ)(1− ω)
αυγ
]
(B.2.27)
Substituting (B.2.25) back into Equation (B.2.24b) and (B.2.24c), on can observe
the optimal consumption in adulthood and retirement:
Ct = Xt =
β
Λ
αFt
qtKt
(B.2.28)
We use first-order conditions to calculate the optimal government spending on
education as follows:
Gt = Ft
(1− υ)ω
υγ
{ φt
1− φt (1− α)−
αη
qtKt
}
(B.2.29)
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The government spending on education is required as strictly positive by this
section. One can substitute (B.2.27) - (B.2.29) into Kt+1 to obtain
Kt+1 = Ft − αFt
[(1− η)
qtKt
− η(1− υ)(1− ω)
qtKtυγ
+
φt
1− φt
(1− α)(1− υ)(1− ω)
αυγ
− 2
qtKt
− ηω
qtKtυγ
]
(B.2.30)
Multiplying (B.2.25) and (B.2.30) term by term, one makes
qt+1Kt+1 = qtKt
[(1− φt)υγ − φt(1− α)(1− υ)
αΛυγ(1− φt)
]
+
η(1− υ)− υγ(3− η)
Λυγ
(B.2.31)
Since F ′t = αFt/Kt, qtKt is solution to linear dynamic Eq. (B.2.31), and the
general solution of this equation is
qtKt =
α(1− φt)[η(1− υ)− υγ(3− η)]
(αΛ− 1)(1− φt)υγ + Λφt(1− α)(1− υ) + ε
[(1− φt)υγ − φt(1− α)(1− υ)
αΛυγ(1− φt)
]t
(B.2.32)
with ε is a real constant.
According to De La Croix and Michel (2002), there is a unique solution which
satisfies the transversality condition limt→∞ ΛtqtKt = 0 and limt→∞ ΛtµtHt = 0: the
constant solution. The transversality condition states that the limit of the actual
shadow value of the capital stock equals zero. Therefore, this subsection forms the
following equation:
qtKt =
α(1− φt)[η(1− υ)− υγ(3− η)]
(αΛ− 1)(1− φt)υγ + Λφt(1− α)(1− υ) (B.2.33)
Following De La Croix and Michel (2002), since qtKt = constant satisfies the
transversality condition, the solution for Equation (B.2.24g) should be µtHt =
constant, hence this subsection yields
µtHt = µt+1Ht+1 = qtKt
(1− α)
α(1− Λυ) (B.2.34)
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We rewrite (B.2.24d) to compute the allocation of parenting time in equilibrium:
η
φt
=
1− α
α
qtKt
1− φt
[
1− Λυγ(1− φt)
(1− Λυ)
1
φt
]
(B.2.35)
Finally, using qt+1Ft = qtKt/αΛ and (B.2.24a)-(B.2.24g), one can obtain that
the parenting time is time-invariant variable as follows:
φ =
η(αΛ− 1)(1− Λυ) + Λ(1− α)[η(1− υ)− υγ(3− η)]
(1− α)[Λγ(1− υ)− 1] + η[(αΛ− 1)(1− Λγ) + Λ(1− α)(1− υ)] (B.2.36)
Eq. (B.2.36) is the social planner’s allocation of parenting time. We require parent-
ing time is strictly positive.
One can see the differences from (B.1.13d). The parenting time (i.e. φt) is addi-
tionally determined by the relative importance between cognitive and non-cognitive
skills in human capital production (i.e. υ) and the importance of parenting time
in the formulation of non-cognitive skills (i.e. γ), rather than just private discount
factor (i.e. β) and the altruism level (i.e. η).
Using (B.2.24a)-(B.2.24g) and (B.2.36), one can make the material investment
in the following manner:
Zt = ZFt (B.2.37)
where Z ≡ [γυ(αΛ − 1) + (1 − α)(1 − υ) φt
1−φt
]1−η− η(1−υ)(1−ω)
υγ
η(1−υ)−υγ(3−η) +
φt
1−φt
(1−α)(1−υ)(1−ω)
υγ
and represents the ratio of material investment in children to aggregate output. We
require the material investment in children is strictly positive.
One can use the first order conditions and (B.2.36) to observe the consumption
in adulthood as follows:
Ct = Xt = XFt (B.2.38)
where X ≡ γυ(αΛ−1)+(1−α)(1−υ)
φt
1−φt
η(1−υ)−υγ(3−η) and is the ratio of consumption in adulthood and
retirement to aggregate output, respectively. This paper restricts that these two
ratios are positive.
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Using the first order conditions and (B.2.36), one formulates the government
spending in education:
Gt = GFt (B.2.39)
where G ≡ (1−υ)ω
η(1−υ)−υγ(2−η)
[
η(1−αΛ)− φt
1−φt (1−α)(2−η)
]
and is the ratio of government
spending in education to aggregate output.
One can rewrite physical and human capital resources by observing (B.2.24a)-
(B.2.24g) and (B.2.36)-(B.2.39). In addition, one can obtain the physical-human
capital ratio takes the following form:
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Ht+1
= ∆(
Kt
Ht
)αυ (B.2.40)
where ∆ is the collection of parameters.
B.2.3 Balanced growth properties
Let us define kt ≡ Kt/Ht. In balanced growth path, the transformation variable
remains at same level. This yields kt+1 = kt = k
∗. Rewriting (B.2.40), one yields
k∗ = ∆
1
1−αυ (B.2.41)
Thus (B.2.41) characterises balanced-growth-path effective physical-human capital
ratio in efficient allocations. Moreover, one can calculate the growth rates in efficient
allocations by using (B.2.41).
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Appendix C
The derivations in the competitive
equilibrium
C.1 Derivation of the growth rate
Together with Assumption 4, (2.18) and (2.19), one can rewrite (2.21) to have
Kt+1 =
β
1 + β
A(1− α)(1− τL)(1− φt)−α(Kt
Ht
)αHt (C.1.1)
Using (2.20), (2.22) and Assumption 4, one can observe (2.14) as
Ht+1 = σ(
Kt
Ht
)α(1−υ)Ht (C.1.2)
where σ ≡ [AB(1− φ)1−αz]1−υDυφγυ.
This Appendix now defines the variables in intensive form. Let kt ≡ Kt/Ht, the
ratio of physical capital to human capital, subjecting to real wage rate and rental
rate of physical capital. One obtains
kt+1 = ψkt
αυ (C.1.3)
where ψ ≡ [Aβ(1− α)]/[σ(1 + β)(1− φ)α].
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This Appendix then derives 1 + ρ∗ = Kt+1/Kt by using (C.1.2)
1 + ρ∗ =
Kt+1
Kt
=
β
1 + β
A(1− α)(1− φ)−αkα−1t (C.1.4)
In balanced growth path, we form the following equation:
1 + ρ∗ =
β
1 + β
A(1− α)(1− η
1 + β
)−αψ−
1−α
1−αυ (C.1.5)
Substituting (2.20), (2.21), and (2.22) into 1 + ρ∗, one can have (2.25).
This Appendix now derives 1 + ρ∗ = Ht+1/Ht. From (C.1.1), one can observe
1 + ρ∗ =
Ht+1
Ht
= [ABz(1− φ)1−α]1−υ(Dφγ)υ(Kt
Ht
)α(1−υ) (C.1.6)
One can plug (2.24) into (C.1.6) to yield (2.25).
Therefore, we have
1 + ρ∗ =
Kt+1
Kt
=
Ht+1
Ht
(C.1.7)
C.2 The transformation variables in steady state
We can rewrite (2.19) and apply (2.24) to make
ω∗ = Aα(
1 + β − η
1 + β
)ψ
α
1−αυ (C.2.8)
One can also rewrite (2.18) and apply (2.24) to form
r∗ = Aα(
1 + β − η
1 + β
)ψ
α−1
1−αυ (C.2.9)
Now using (C.2.8) and (C.2.9), we can yield
Z∗ =
Zt
Ht
=
1− η
1 + β
Aα(
1 + β − η
1 + β
)ψ
α
1−αυ (C.2.10a)
X∗ =
Xt+1
Ht
=
β
1 + β
[1 + Aα(
1 + β − η
1 + β
)ψ
α−1
1−αυ ]Aα(
1 + β − η
1 + β
)ψ
α
1−αυ (C.2.10b)
According to Assumption 4, we can have S∗ in steady state.
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C.3 All equations in definition 1
The budget and time constraints
The budget constraints for the agent in adulthood and in retirement are
Zt + St = LtwtHt (2.6a (a))
Xt+1 = (1 + rt+1)St (2.6b (a))
Lt + φt = 1 (2.6c (a))
Firm’s optimisation problem in the general functional forms
Firm’s optimisation condition is
rt =
∂Yt
∂Kt
≡ F (1)t and wt =
∂Yt
∂Ht
≡ F (2)t (2.7 (a))
Consumer’s optimisation problem in the general functional forms
First-order conditions for an interior solution are
u
(1)
t = λt (2.8a (a))
u
(2)
t = λtwtHt (2.8b (a))
ν ′ =
λt
1 + rt+1
(2.8c (a))
Firm’s optimisation problem in specific functional forms
Rental rate of physical capital is given by
rt = AαK
α−1
t (LtHt)
1−α (2.18 (a))
Real wage rate of human capital is given by
wt = A(1− α)Kαt (LtHt)−α (2.19 (a))
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Consumer’s optimisation problem in specific functional forms
First-order conditions for an interior solution are
Zt =
1− η
1 + β
wtHt (2.20 (a))
Xt+1 =
β
1 + β
(1 + rt+1)wtHt (2.21 (a))
φt =
η
1 + β
(2.22 (a))
Assumption 4
Kt+1 = It = St.
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Appendix D
The solutions of the social
planner’s problem
The parenting time is a time-invariant variable:
φ =
ηΛ(αΛ− 1)(1− Λυ) + Λ(1− α)[Λη(1− υ)− Λυγ(1− η)− βυγ]
(1− α)[−Λ(1− η)− β][(1− Λυ) + Λγυ] + ηΛ(αΛ− 1)(1− Λυ) + ηΛ2(1− α)(1− υ)
(3.34 (a))
The material investment is as follows:
Z = ZF (Kt, (Ht, Lt)) (3.35 (a))
where Z ≡ [Λγυ(αΛ− 1) + Λ(1−α)(1−υ) φ
1−φ
] 1−η− η(1−υ)
υγ
Λη(1−υ)−Λυγ(1−η)−βυγ +
φ
1−φ
(1−α)(1−υ)
υγ
.
The consumption in old-age generation takes the following form:
X = XF (Kt, (Ht, Lt)) (3.36 (a))
where X ≡ Λγυ(αΛ−1)+Λ(1−α)(1−υ)
φ
1−φ
Λη(1−υ)−Λυγ(1−η)−βυγ .
The resource constraints of physical capital is
Kt+1 = F (Kt, (Ht, Lt))αΛ (3.37 (a))
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We obtain the resource constraints of human capital as the following:
Ht+1 = F (Kt, (Ht, Lt))
1−υϑHυt (3.38 (a))
where ϑ is constant parameter collection, ϑ ≡ 〈BZ〉1−υ〈Dφγ〉υ.
Finally, one can observe the physical-human capital ratio as
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Ht+1
= ∆(
Kt
Ht
)αυ (3.39 (a))
where ∆ ≡ αΛAυ(1− φ)(1−α)υ/ϑ.
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Appendix E
The derivations in optimal
taxation
The purpose of this Appendix is to show the derivations of the optimal tax
rates as described in (4.28), (4.29) and (4.30) in Chapter 5. Comparing (4.12a) and
(4.20a), we have the relationship between material investment and time investment
in the competitive equilibrium:
η
(1− η)
(1− θ)
(1− τL)
Zt
φt
= (1− α) Yt
1− φt (E.0.1)
Comparing (4.20c) and (4.20e), the relationship between material investment
and time investment in the efficient allocation is
η
φt
− Λqt+1 η
(1− η)
(1− θ)
(1− τL)
Zt
φt
+ Λµt+1Ht+1
υγ
φt
= 0 (E.0.2)
Rearranging (E.0.2), we formulate
η + Λµt+1Ht+1υγ
η
(1−η)
(1−θ)
(1−τL)
= Λqt+1Zt (E.0.3)
Now we plug (E.0.3) back to (4.20c) to yield
(1− η)− (1− η)(1− τL)
1− θ + Λµt+1Ht+1
[
− (1− η)(1− τL)υγ
η(1− θ) + (1− υ)(1− ω)
]
= 0
(E.0.4)
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We can substitute (4.20d) into (4.20c) to have the relationship between material
investment and retirement consumption in the efficient allocation:
(1− η)− Zt
Xt
+ Λµt+1Ht+1(1− υ)(1− ω) (E.0.5)
Comparing (4.12a) and (4.12b), we have the relationship between material in-
vestment and retirement consumption in the competitive-equilibrium allocation:
Zt
Xt
=
1− η
β(1− θ)[1 + (1− τK)rt]
λt−1
λt
(E.0.6)
One can obtain the shadow price of the physical capital is as follows:
λt =
1 + β
(1− τL)Htwt (E.0.7)
Substituting (E.0.7) into (E.0.6) and rearranging it, we make
Zt
Xt
=
1− η[
qt+1
qt
+ 1−τK
Λ
]
β(1− θ) (E.0.8)
Using (4.21), we can rewrite (E.0.8) as
Zt
Xt
=
1− η[
1
rt
+ (1− τK)
]
β
Λ
(1− θ) (E.0.9)
so that we have the relationship between material investment in children and the
consumption of old generation.
Now we substitute (E.0.9) into (E.0.5) to have
(1− η)− (1− η)[
1
rt
+ (1− τK)
]
β
Λ
(1− θ) + Λµt+1Ht+1(1− υ)(1− ω) = 0 (E.0.10)
Now this Appendix derives the equations to make (3.37) and (3.38). Dividing
(4.12b) by (4.12c), we yield
Xt
φt
=
β
η
[
1 + (1− τK)α Yt
Kt
][
(1− τL)(1− α) Yt
1− φt
]Yt−1
Yt
(E.0.11)
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Equation (E.0.11) gives the relationship between parenting time and the consump-
tion of old generation.
Dividing (4.20d) by (4.20e), then using (E.0.11), we form
η − η[
1
rt
+ (1− τK)
]
β
Λ
(1− τL)
+ Λµt+1Ht+1υγ = 0 (E.0.12)
We rearrange the (E.0.4) to have (1− τL) on the left-hand side:
1− τL = (1− θ)[(1− η) + Λµt+1Ht+1(1− υ)(1− ω)]
(1− η)[1 + Λµt+1Ht+1 υγη ]
(E.0.13)
We then plug it into (E.0.12) to yield
η− η(1− α)(1− η)
[
1 + Λµt+1Ht+1
υγ
η
][
1
rt
+ (1− τK)
]
β
Λ
(1− θ)[(1− η) + Λµt+1Ht+1(1− υ)(1− ω)]+Λµt+1Ht+1υγ = 0
(E.0.14)
Now this Appendix compares the rearrangement of (E.0.11) and (E.0.14) to
formulate (4.28). Rearranging (E.0.11) obtains the following equation:
1− θ = 1− η
β[ 1
Λrt
+ (1− τK) 1Λ ][(1− η) + Λµt+1Ht+1(1− υ)(1− ω)]
(E.0.15)
The rearrangement of (E.0.14) is as follows:
1− θ = η(1− α)
β
[
1+(1−τK)rt
][
(1−η)+Λµt+1Ht+1(1−υ)(1−ω)
]
(1−η)
[
1+Λµt+1Ht+1
υγ
η
] (η+Λµt+1Ht+1υγ)
Λrt
(E.0.16)
we can compare (E.0.15) and (E.0.16) to have (4.28).
One then substitutes (4.28) into (E.0.15) to yield (4.29) and plugs (4.29) into
(E.0.14) to find (4.30).
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Appendix F
Calibration
In line with empirical evidences, the parameter α is the capital share in goods
production and is set to 1/3 to match the empirical counterpart. This thesis chooses
a value of private discount factor that is standard in the literature, β = 1/(1.0225) =
0.6095, following De La Croix and Doepke (2003).
For parameter γ, which is the share of parenting time in human capital formu-
lation, this section considers the following case.
Case 1. γ is 1, greater or smaller than 1.
The first (second and third) part implies that every unit of parenting time can
bring equal (higher and lower) unit of non-cognitive skills times the exogenous pro-
ductivity to human capital production.
With regard to parameter υ, which is the relative importance of cognitive and
non-cognitive skills in the production of human capital. This section studies the
following case.
Case 2. υ is 0.5, greater or smaller than 0.5.
The first (second and third) part implies that non-cognitive skills is equally (more
and less) important to cognitive skills in human capital production.
Heckman et al. (2006) shows that the same low-dimensional vector of abilities can
explain schooling choices, wages, employment, work experience, choice of occupation
and a wide variety of risky behaviors. It demonstrates that cognitive skills and non-
cognitive skills are equally important in explaining a variety of aspects of social and
economic life. The non-cognitive skill is more malleable than cognitive skill (Cunha
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et al., 2005). It points out that IQ is rank stable after age 10, whereas personality
skills are malleable through adolescence and into early adulthood.
Moreover, Cunha and Heckman (2008) use a sample from the Children of the
National Longitudinal survey of Youth (CNLSY/79) in the US to suggests that the
share of time investment in children in the human capital production is 0.8. This
implies that non-cognitive skills are more malleable than cognitive skills, hence the
parameter is chosen as 0.75.
For the relative preference between material and time investment, η, this paper
analyses the following case.
Case 3. η is 0.5, greater or smaller than 0.5.
The first (second and third) part implies that parents attache equal (higher and
lower) utility toward time investment.
The empirical evidence in Haveman and Wolfe (1994) and Knowles (1999) sug-
gest that the parenting time is equivalent to about 15 percent of the parents time
endowment, which implies that η is 0.24, as discussed after Equation (2.22):
φt =
η
1 + β
(2.22 (a))
so the value of η is chosen as 0.25.
The benchmark parametreisation is selected so as to obtain the balanced growth
rate equals to 2 percent (Basu et al., 2012). Attributing all of the growth in multi-
factor productivity to growth in labour-augmenting productivity implies that A is
3.8023, see (2.25):
1 + ρ∗ =
[ Aβ(1− α)
(1 + β)(1− η
1+β
)α
]α(1−υ)
1−αυ
[
Dυ(
η
1 + β
)γυ
[
AB(1− η
1 + β
)1−α
]1−υ] 1−α1−αυ
(2.25 (a))
Using a backward solving method (i.e. swapping endogenous variables and pa-
rameters) and assuming B = D, we obtain B = D = 1.7249 in (2.14):
Ht+1 = Hc,t
1−υHnc,tυ (2.14 (a))
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In addition to choose parameters, this paper also needs to set the initial con-
ditions for the simulations. The overall size of the population is a scale parameter
which does not affect the results. In our model, population remains the same size, so
the population growth rates is zero. This paper therefore only specifies the aggregate
values. The initial distribution of human capital follows a log-normal distribution.
This paper provides simulations for different variances of the distribution in order to
examine the effects of inefficiency. The initial levels of physical and human capital
are chosen, so that the ratio of physical to human capital equals its value in the
balanced growth path.
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Appendix G
Discussion
G.1 Parenting time appears in both cognitive skills
and non-cognitive skills
The production of human capital with cognitive skills is
Hc,t = BGt
ωZt
1−ωφγt (G.1.1)
one can see the parenting time appears in cognitive skills accumulation, following
Del Boca et al. (2013).
The production of human capital with non-cognitive skills is
Hnc,t = Dφt
γHt (G.1.2)
The production of human capital is described as the following equation:
Ht+1 = (BtG
ω
t Z
1−ω
t )
1−υDυtH
υ
t φ
γ
t (G.1.3)
Here, the issue is one can not distinguish parenting time comes from cognitive
skills or non-cognitive skills. Therefore, the setting of the production of human
capital in the main text not only can set up two channels but also can tell the
parenting time comes from which channels.
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